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“Sustainable Development or the Resource Curse? 
The Role of CSR at Newmont’s Ahafo Mine in Ghana”   
By Jay Chou 
 
Corporate Social Responsibility claims that social and economic development is 
possible in mineral-dependent countries.  Viewed as a tool for reducing impacts of 
mining, CSR is increasingly implemented on a voluntary basis by mining companies.  
Such claims assume that mining and development can be achieved, and that through CSR, 
resource rich countries can avoid negative impacts of resource development, also known 
as the “resource curse”. This thesis seeks to explore CSR’s attempts to address some of 
the factors that limit’s mining’s contributions to development.  In examining Newmont 
Mining Corporation’s Ahafo Mine in Ghana, the research finds that CSR seeks to 
mitigate the economic, social, and political impacts of mining.  Specifically, voluntary 
CSR promotes local economic development, human development in areas of education 
and health, and improve transparency and accountability.  However, the research finds 
that without government involvement, CSR is ineffective due to voluntary nature of the 
programs.    
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
Research Context and Problem  
Natural resources such as minerals are an important source of national wealth that 
can provide benefits to the wellbeing of its citizens.  Despite the immense wealth that 
resource development can provide, mining’s contribution to development has often had 
the opposite, creating instead a “resource curse” – a phenomenon in which social and 
economic development indicators have languished and regressed in countries that rely on 
resource revenue.  The lack of development has spearheaded renewed calls to mitigate 
these effects.  Many have put forward the idea that by implementing corporate social 
responsibility (CSR), the root causes of the resource curse can be mitigated. The objective 
of the thesis seeks to explore the validity of such a claim.   
Currently, as Africa’s second largest gold producer after South Africa, Ghana’s 
gold mining sector has been a key driver of its unprecedented economic growth.  Mineral 
development now represents Ghana’s top export commodity followed by cocoa and 
forestry (Bloch and Owusu, 2012: 434).  Over the past decade the mining industry has 
benefited from soaring mineral production with gold revenue recorded at $600 million 
higher than in 2008 at $2.8 billion (ibid, p.434).  In  2012 and 2013, the minerals sector 
accounted for 43 and 37.6 percent of Ghana’s export, respectively (Chamber of Mines, 
2013).  The rise of the gold mining industry became possible after the 1986 economic 
reforms.  And since then the sector has successfully attracted more than $5 billion of 
direct investment for exploration (Yankson, 2010: 355).  The influx of investment has led 
to doubling of the number of gold mining companies operating in the country (ICMM, 
2007: 22).  
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This growth, however, has not improved the country’s position as a lower-middle 
income country.  Instead, Ghana is now considered a “mineral-dependent” country by 
Haglund (2011) and Ross (2001) who have established this as a benchmark when 
countries rely on mineral export for more than twenty-five percent of its total exports, 
making it susceptible to the resource curse (Haglund, 2011: 4; Ross, 2001).  
Consequently, Ghana’s mining sector has been under intense scrutiny by the 
country’s citizens and civil society over its contribution to national development in 
areas of job creation, government revenues, land-use conflicts and the industry 
friendly mining legislation (Akabzaa, 2009).  In assessing whether Ghana’s mineral 
wealth has contributed to development, studies point to evidence of the resource 
curse responsible for stifling mining’s full potential for the developmental benefit of 
the people (Standing and Hilson, 2013: 2).  Meanwhile, CSR programs have also 
proliferated, a trend Larsen et al. (2009) explain as an outcome of the mining 
sector’s limited contributions to the economy and national development.  Observers 
such as Larsen et al. (2009) also suggest that the private sector and CSR’s voluntary 
measures now remain the only option for the industry to maximize its contributions 
to the economy while addressing mining’s negative impacts. Otherwise, Ghana is at 
high risk of the resource curse.   
The rise of the mineral industry and threat of the resource curse is not unique to 
Ghana.  A recent 2013 report by the United Nations Economic Commission on Africa 
(UNECA), the organization highlighted the continent’s remarkable economic growth 
between 2002-2012 driven by mineral commodities with an average growth of 5.6 
percent from 2002 to 2008, and recovery growth of 4.6 percent and 5 percent in 2010 and 
2012, respectively, after the 2009 recession (UNECA, 2013: 6).  While this is a 
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remarkable turnaround from stagnant growth of the 1980s -1990s, dependency on 
commodity-led growth can have limited social development benefits.  Resource 
dependency can result in slower progress in education, mortality rates, and gender 
equality, at the same time unable to keep pace with economic growth (UNECA, 2013: 6).  
Over the years, the resource curse has demonstrated that the greater a country’s mineral 
dependence, the lower they rank in the Human Development Index (HDI).  Of the world’s 
twenty-five most mineral-dependent states in 1995, nearly half are classified as “highly-
indebted poor countries” (HIPC) by the World Bank (Ross, 1999: 7), and fifteen countries 
ranked lower than 114 of 174 countries in the HDI rankings.1  Ghana, although not as 
heavily dependent as the top ten, ranked eighteenth among the world’s most dependent 
countries on minerals and ranked 129 in the HDI.  Between 1996 and 2010, the number of 
mineral-dependent countries in low- and middle-income countries have only increased 
from 23 to 32 with half of them in Sub-Sahara Africa, including Ghana where scholars 
have cautioned is at the risk of the resource curse (Haglund, 2011).2   
The concerns raised by UNECA (2013) reflect the ongoing challenges facing 
mineral dependent states: how can mineral extraction contribute to development?  
Despite the bourgeoning literature and evidence on the negative effects of mineral export, 
Western governments and international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are undeterred about mining’s 
contributions to development.  Most notably, despite the resource curse, CSR and 
voluntary contributions by the private sector has emerged as a tool for improving the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Mineral dependence is defined by Ross (1999) as “the ratio of non-fuel mineral exports to GDP 
(p.7). 
2!Haglund’s criteria for measuring mineral dependency is countries whose mineral exports make 
up more than twenty-five percent.   
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negative results.  Based on the principles of sustainable development, CSR claims to 
ensure mining operations benefit communities (Hamann, 2003; Yakovleva, 2005; 
UNECA, 2011: 82).  Many multinational mining corporations are increasingly utilizing 
CSR as a tool to address social and environmental impacts of mineral development. This 
involves “maximizing the positive and minimizing the negative social and environmental 
impacts of mining, while maintaining profits: in short, contributing to sustainable 
development.” (Hamann, 2003: 237-238).  
The research seeks to assess CSR’s ability to address mining’s negative impacts 
and poor developmental outcomes attributed to the resource curse. This is aimed at 
answering the following research question: Can CSR mitigate the resource curse, and 
therefore contribute to economic and social development in Ghana?   
To answer this question, a review of resource curse and CSR literatures is required 
to establish how CSR is increasingly directed at mitigating the resource curse by 
addressing the causal mechanisms that lead to negative developmental outcomes.  
Second, the thesis evaluates a case study to determine if CSR programs achieved its goals 
of contributing social and economic development, and, thereby mitigate the resource 
curse.  The case study used to test this research question is Newmont Mining 
Corporation’s Ahafo Mine in Ghana.  
To undertake this research, the thesis will carry out two tasks.  The first tasks will 
be to rationalize the emergence of CSR in the mining industry in relation to the resource 
curse.  This includes a description of the CSR objectives and programs carried out by 
Newmont at their Ahafo Mine.  The second task undertaken as part of field research in 
Ghana in 2013, examines the impact of these CSR programs on the communities involved 
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to determine whether they have made it possible to avoid the social, economic, and 
political consequences associated with the resource curse.  
 Based on review of CSR and resource curse, the proposed thesis statement is the 
following: while CSR programs aim to improve negative outcomes of the resource curse 
by minimizing social and economic impacts and maximizing development benefits 
through a set of social and economic programs, the private-sector approach and reliance 
on voluntary initiatives and programs is far from adequate to address the factors that 
contribute to negative developmental impacts of mining. To avoid the resource curse, 
greater intervention is required by the government in the mining sector.  Specifically, 
government intervention and regulation is necessary to hold mining companies 
accountable for the targets and promises made as part of their voluntary CSR programs.    
Literature Review 
Mining and development is highly debated in the development literature.  As 
Kemp (2009) explains, current understanding of mining’s contribution to development 
has been closely examined through the “resource curse”, revenue transparency, 
redistribution of benefits to local communities, and impacts on local communities (p.201).  
These issues, however, can be categorized within two substantive bodies of literature: 
first, the resources curse literature, which only until recently, attributes governance and 
institutional qualities as contributing factors for government’s inability to redistribute 
mineral wealth for national and local development (e.g. see Ross, 1999; Humphreys et al., 
2007; Hilson and Maconachie, 2009; Standing and Hilson, 2013; Bulte et al. 2005); and 
second, CSR which calls on business firms to conduct business operations in a socially 
responsible way that minimizes negative social and environmental impact on local 
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communities (e.g. see Hamann, 2003) and contribute to development (Blowfield and 
Frynas, 2005).    
At first glance, CSR and the resource curse may seem contradictory.  On the one 
hand, the resource curse paints a pessimistic view that mineral wealth cannot contribute to 
national development.  Sachs and Warner (2001) lays out strong empirical evidence for 
existence of the curse, and Hilson and Maconachie (2009) further argue that today’s most 
promising policy attempts at lifting the curse (i.e. Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative) remain inadequate unless significant institutional change is in place.  The CSR 
literature, on the other hand, posits that resource-led development is possible through 
partnerships between all stakeholders, and by creating necessary “enabling conditions” 
involving responsible, functioning state (Fox et al., 2002; Ite, 2004).  Even amongst the 
most vocal critics of the CSR agenda, some suggest that CSR, under certain 
circumstances, may potentially lead to development (Blowfield and Frynas, 2005; 
Idemudia, 2011).   
As the CSR agenda become increasingly intertwined with issues relating to 
international development (e.g. poverty alleviation, working standards, education, health, 
conflict, transparency, accountability, and resource revenues across various industries, 
including mining are now central to private sector’s CSR agenda (Fox, 2004: 33)), an 
important underlying assumption is the assertion that the resource curse can be addressed 
by adopting CSR’s voluntary-based approach aimed at providing benefits to local 
communities, contributing to community development, minimizing impact on 
environment, while contribute to state coffers (Dansereau, 2010: 65).  However, whether 
CSR systematically addresses the deficits and causal mechanisms identified in the 
resource curse literature remains a critical gap between the two substantive literatures.  
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Resource(Based,Growth,and,Development,,
Mining’s contribution to development is highly contested.  Two polarizing views 
dominate this contentious debate: first is the view that mining can serve as an “engine of 
growth” that makes possible social and economic development; and second is the 
alternative view known as the resource curse.  Championed by neoclassical economics, 
the pro-mining view is commonly shared by industry, IFIs and governments around the 
world that mining can serve as an important platform and launching-pad for 
industrialization and sustainable development (e.g. see Ericsson and Noras, 2005; ICMM, 
2012; Labonne, 1999, 2002; UNECA, 2011).  Development economists have long 
supported the belief that an export-led development model based on exploitation of 
natural resource would provide the capital needed by developing countries to industrialize 
and diversify their economies (Weinthal and Luong, 2006: 36).  The emphasis on mining 
as vehicle for “economic development” centres on the positive causal relationship 
between mining and economic growth.  According to the neoclassical economics’ concept 
of production function, the more resources (i.e. natural capital) a country possesses, the 
greater the wealth is generated from higher output and per capital income (Davis and 
Tilton, 2005: 234).  As export increases and accelerates economic development, resource 
rents can be used for savings and reinvested into the economy.   
The pro-mining view attributes the poor developmental performances of many 
impoverished countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America to lack of foreign capital for 
investment (Ross, 2001: 6).  Without capital to invest, developing countries suffered from 
surplus of labour in rural areas unable to engage in productive activities to create the 
conditions for growth (Ross, 2001; Auty, 2003: 4).  The staple theory of growth argues 
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that by attracting foreign companies to exploit the mineral deposits, this would overcome 
the imbalances in the factors of production.3  According to this view, mineral deposits are 
seen as wealth assets that provide developing countries economic opportunities for 
development (Davis and Tilton, 2005: 233).  Profits from the mining industry would be 
channeled toward the construction of infrastructure, and re-invested in linkages that 
would add-value and process the commodities in its raw form before exported (Ross, 
2001: 6).  Additionally, other enabling conditions such transportation and power creates 
“clusters” of industrial growth (Weber-Fahr, 2002: 3).  The doctrine of comparative 
advantage also supported the need for foreign investment and resource extraction.  
Economists such as Bauer and Yamey (1957) and MacBean (1966) further argued that 
export of commodities as a comparative advantage over resource-poor countries by 
generating the foreign capital necessary to pay for imports and reinvestment (cited in 
Auty, 2003).   
State%Led(Development((
The endorsement for mining and its contribution to industrialization and national 
development has evolved and taken several forms since the 1950s.  From the 1950s to 
1970s, state ownership and nationalization of mining and other industrial sectors 
dominated the national development strategies of newly independent developing 
countries.  Under a state-led development model, governments were very active in the 
development of its national economies.  At the same time, the state legitimized its 
authority over its citizens by providing social programs and services (Clark, 2003: 4).  
Compared to today, developing countries during this time were described as “excessive 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 As Ross (2001: 6) explains, the imbalance in developing countries’ factors of production refers 
to the surpluses of labour and lack of investable capital.   
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state control” (Hilson and Haselip, 2004: 26).  Furthermore, Arthur (2006b) explains this 
model of economic development was based on an interventionist approach that embodied 
the structuralist theory and state-led development.  Based on the Prebisch-Singer thesis, 
structuralists cautioned against a development strategy that is overly dependent on 
resource-export, and imbalances in terms of trade between the North and the South as a 
consequence of such strategy (Ross, 1999: 301).  On the basis that capital are generated 
by resource-export to help pay for manufacture imports, structuralists advocated for 
import-substitution-industrialization (ISI) to protect infant industries and to meet 
domestic market demands.   
Market%Led(Development((
Beginning in the early 1980s, the state-led development model of resource 
extraction was replaced with a neoliberal approach: a resource-export model led by the 
private sector.  The shift from the state to the private sector became possible as the 
Bretton Woods Institutions liberalized economies of the Global South and divested key 
industrial sectors like mining through neoliberal reforms (Hilson and Haselip, 2004: 26).  
Neoliberal reforms consists of a set of economic policies – commonly referred to as the 
“Washington Concensus” – that emphasized superiority of markets and private sector to 
stimulate economic growth by generating jobs and revenues in the Global South (Haselip 
and Hilson, 2005: 88).  The architects behind the Concensus were Washington-based IFIs 
(WB and the IMF) supported by Western governments as donor partners.  As described 
by Szablowski (2007), the coalition agreed to a set of economic reform policies, which, 
broadly speaking, endorsed the following agenda with emphasis on reducing the state:  
1. Privatization of state-owned industries;  
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2. Halt restriction on foreign ownership and capital;  
3. Lowering of taxation and royalty rates; and  
4. Restructuring of labour laws for greater flexibility. 
In the view of the Bretton-Wood Institutions, economic reforms in key industrial sectors 
such as mining, and together with amendments to mineral policies, provide the incentives 
for attracting foreign investors and FDIs for growth.  FDIs in the mining sector became 
critical in providing the much needed currency in mineral-dependent economies 
(Szablowski, 2007: 27).   
The World Bank, according to its own technical report, attributed under-
achievements in Africa’s economies as the underdevelopment of its mining sector, 
resulting in loss of economic opportunity (World Bank, 1992: x).  Through the 
implementation of neoliberal reforms, Hilson and Haselip (2004) outline the innumerable 
investing opportunities enjoyed by mining MNCS, which contributed to increased 
mineral production in the economies of Africa and other countries in the Global South.  
Neoliberal reforms in mineral-economies were viewed as a necessary alternative 
to the state-led development model, which pinpointed political factors such as the state 
for the underdevelopment of the economy.  Politically, neoliberals and the World Bank 
held the view that states needed to be reduced in size and intervention in the economy 
minimized.  Supporters of this view blamed governments for the developmental failures 
by arguing that states were too big and interventionists in nature.  For example, the World 
Bank point out that between 1960 and 1995, governments of the industrial countries 
expanded twice their size since independence and accomplished this inefficiently through 
transfers and subsidies (World Bank, 1997: 22).  The Bank’s diagnosis for constrained 
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economic growth as inefficient policies that favoured ISI and state-ownership of mining 
and other industrial sectors (World Bank, 1992: 9).   
The key message of Washington Concensus reforms is that governments are to 
blame for the development failures.  The main objectives of the neoliberal reforms were 
to remedy the problem of state intervention by reducing state involvement in the economy 
from an interventionist toward a more “minimalist” role (Szablowski, 2007: 34).  To do 
so, the 1992 World Bank report suggested that that the “state’s interest is better served if 
it limits itself to promotion and regulation of industry and allows private investors to do 
the mining” (cited in Akabzaa, 2009: 43).  Specifically, government’s new responsibility 
for promoting and regulating industry is to focus on the following: ensure macroeconomic 
stability for the private sector; encourage and attract foreign investment; and provide 
basic social services in areas of education, health care and infrastructure (Szablowski, 
2007: 34).  With the private sector responsible for mining operations, the state’s new 
responsibilities is to only maximize tax revenues, and to abandon other economic and 
political objectives (World Bank, 1992: x).   
Despite claims about economic benefits of neoliberal reforms, scholars have 
challenged these claims and suggest that the negative outcomes of reforms outweigh 
benefits.  First, Biersteker (1990) highlight several political implications from reducing 
the state in the economy.  One important implication is that despite the Bank’s own 
mandate of neutrality and non-interference in the domestic political affairs of the state, 
reforms have the effect of redirecting state intervention away from a given development 
strategy (Biersteker, 1990: 489).  When faced with reforms attached to conditional loans, 
Biersteker (1990) argue that ISI and social reform, both of which were development 
strategies of many developing countries during that period, became under attack (ibid, 
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p.489).  Biersteker concludes reforms aimed at reducing state intervention may in fact 
“undercut” its regulatory intervention, undermine the state’s fiscal capacity and revenue 
base, and ultimately strip away the legitimacy of the state (ibid, p.489-490).   
A second impact neoliberal reforms have had is the confinement of state 
responsibilities away from social and political goals to an efficient regulator whose focus 
is on technical issues, and at the same time attracting foreign investment (Szablowski, 
2007: 7).  Szablowski’s (2007) observation on the long-term effects confirms Biersteker’s 
hypothesis of a weakened state, or one that has been undercut.  Since the reforms, states 
maintained a reputation as a market- and investor-friendly jurisdiction; and at the same 
time, reluctant to take on an assertive or interventionist role in fear of discouraging future 
investment (Szablowski, 2007: 44).  Furthermore, Szablowski (2007) suggests that states 
adopted a strategy of “selective absence” whereby the responsibility for mediating with 
communities have been delegated to MNCs by the state, particularly in situations that 
favoured mining interests.  As a result, there is the assumption that MNCs are assuming 
state-like responsibilities at the discretion of weak governments (ibid, p.59).   
Lastly, Frynas (2004) suggests that new responsibilities of the state to promote 
and attract investment have given freedom for MNCs to exploit differences in regulations 
between nation-states (p. 365).  Originally termed by Leyshon (1992), “regulatory 
arbitrage” refers to the relocation of manufacturing plants by MNCs from one country to 
another in the pursuit of more favourable regulatory regime (cited in Frynas, 2004: 365).  
In order to attract foreign investment, governments found themselves competing against 
each other by offering incentives.  In other words, the Bank’s set of neoliberal reforms is 
to encourage competition between nation-states to attract foreign investments 
(Szablowski, 2007: 34).   
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For example, a number of African countries reformed its mining codes to 
outcompete each mining sector aimed at attracting foreign investments.  Campbell 
(2003a) notes that Africa’s three generations of mining codes reflect process of 
liberalization, privatization and deregulation.  During the process, questions arise over 
whether reforms in the name of competition are compatible with environmental standards 
and national developmental objectives (p.108).  Consequently, Campbell (2003b) contend 
that the reforms have had the “effect of driving down norms and standards in areas of 
critical importance for social and economic development, as well as the protection of the 
environment in the countries concerned” (p.3).  
 The competitive race for investment has fundamentally altered the development 
strategies of developing countries from the “state-led development” strategies of ISI 
toward what Sagebien and Whellams (2010) calls “state-led investment in development” 
(p.488).4  According to Bridge (2004), FDI flows have increased 12-fold from 1980 – 
1998 into newly accessible economies of the developing countries, and predicts that the 
bulk of future mine production will come from the Global South (p.418).  Hilson and 
Haselip (2004) confirms that mineral production has increased substantially from 
neoliberal-driven mining reforms to attract FDI, but further notes that the benefits to 
MNCs vis-à-vis weak regulations and taxation and financial incentives have outweighed 
the contributions to local communities from the sector.  This asymmetrical outcome in the 







investor-friendly mining legislation and reforms is compatible with sustainable 
development (e.g. see Akabazaa, 2009; Hilson, 2010).   
Sustainable(Development(and(Poverty(Reduction(
Since the neoliberal reforms of the 1980s, support for mining has been to promote 
the industry’s contribution to sustainable and development and poverty reduction.  In 
general terms, “sustainable development” is the protection of the environment and 
pollution prevention without jeopardizing socio-economic growth (Hilson and Murck, 
2000).  This generalized definition is akin to the Brundtland Commission’s Our Common 
Future report which defined sustainable development as “meeting the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” 
(WCED, 1987 cited in Hilson & Murck, 2000).   
At first glance, the suggestion that the extraction of finite resources contributes to 
sustainable development seems incompatible and incongruent.  Despite the apparent 
contradiction in this logic, economists uphold the view that the exploitation and depletion 
of mineral resources are feasible and sustainable (Auty, 2003: 9).  Although numerous 
interpretations of “sustainable development” have proliferated since the Brundtland 
Commission’s report titled Our Common Future, Auty and Mikesell (1998) suggests that 
the marriage between mining and sustainable development should be measured by a 
country’s ability to maximize economic growth while meeting the country’s social 
priorities.  Their concept of sustainable development is not solely based mining’s 
contribution to economic growth, but mining’s ability to contribute to social development 
over the long-run (ibid: 3).  Thus, the underlying assumption is that sustainable 
development is possible in spite of declining mineral resources, but only on the condition 
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that mineral wealth is reinvested into other economic and social activities that sustains 
wealth to be transferred from one generation to the next (Labonne, 1999: 318)  
Mining’s contribution to sustainable development and poverty reduction presume 
that countries endowed with rich mineral deposits generates economic rents and wealth 
by converting natural capital into other forms of capital.  Mineral resources are mined 
profitably and invested into physical capital such as building infrastructure such as 
schools, roads, clinics, factories, railways and homes that maintains economic 
development (Davis and Tilton, 2005).  Other forms of capital identified by Davis and 
Tilton (2005) include conversion of natural capital into human capital by investing in 
education, healthcare, water sanitation; or investment into legal and governance structures 
to create institutional capital (ibid, p.234).  Mining and sustainable development becomes 
possible when other forms of capital contribute to economic development.  In other 
words, natural capital’s capacity to generate wealth is replaced by human and institutional 
capital’s capacity to generate income for future generations (Auty, 2003: 9).   
The sustainability concept of converting natural capital into other productive 
forms of capital has been widely embraced by the mining industry.  International mining 
organizations such as International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM) and the World 
Gold Council (WGC) defines sustainability as the mining’s contributions to long-term 
benefits to society.  For instance, ICMM views mining activities as sustainable 
development when operations are “… undertaken in such a way that the activity itself … 
provide a net positive long-term contribution to human and ecosystem well-being.” 
(ICMM, 2012: 5).  Similarly, WGC’s commitment entails “economic and social 
development of local communities whilst providing important national revenue …” 
(WGC, 2014).    
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Mining is said to reduce poverty based on the widely accepted assumption that 
economic growth is a precondition for poverty reduction.  Based on this logic, Pegg 
(2006) notes that it makes sense that if mining contributes to economic growth, then it 
should have an impact on poverty reduction (p. 376).  For this to be realized, economists 
contend that foreign direct investments (FDIs) from MNCs are needed to promote 
development and poverty alleviation.  IFIs such as the World Bank Group (WBG), whose 
mandate is to reduce poverty and support development, have been at the forefront in 
promoting investments in developing countries’ mining sector as part of the 
organization’s donor assistance programs.5  The organization’s mandate is firmly driven 
by the assumption that “economic growth per se is a well-documented prerequisite to 
sustainable development and poverty reduction” (Weber-Fahr, 2002: 13).  At the WBG’s 
disposal, the organization promotes FDIs into mineral economies through trade 
liberalization, privatization, deregulation and legislative reforms (Pegg, 2003: 6).  Besides 
mining’s opportunities for economic growth, WBG’s justification for supporting the 
sector to reduces poverty through the following ways: revenues through taxes and 
royalties, new jobs and employment opportunities, transfer of technology, improved 
infrastructure, and lastly, creation of downstream industries (Pegg, 2003: 1).  These are 
benefits that will flow to the states from MNCs by promoting FDIs into mining 
(Idemudia, 2008: 91).6    
The main economic priorities of developing countries are job creation and revenue 
collection, which are reasons why foreign investments are encouraged by governments 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 For example, between 1995 and 1999, the World Bank Group spent close to $6 billion to fund 
mining projects around the world (Sampat, 2003: 123-124).   
6!For further reading on economic development’s school of thought on transfer of benefits from 
MNCs to the state, Idemudia (2008) suggests the following readings: Rostow, 1960; Stanley, 
1972; Inkeles and Smith 1974; Freeman, 1998; and Graham 1991.!!!
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(Hamann, 2003: 248). Resource-rich countries look toward mining for the job 
opportunities and the contributions it can make for reducing poverty.  This is possible 
through the incomes workers earn for their families that may have been previously 
unemployed.  Employee contributes to the local economies by making remittances in cash 
and non-monetary forms such as construction and building materials, transportation to 
household members (World Bank, 2013b: 200).  Similarly, cash remittances are spent on 
education and looking after wellbeing of family members. 
Mining also reduces poverty by investing revenues collected through taxes and 
royalties into poverty reduction programs.  As Pegg (2006: 380) suggests, poverty 
alleviation is possible through the following channel: “mining ! taxes, revenues and 
royalties for the government ! improved financing for targeted poverty alleviation 
policies ! poverty reduction.” (p 380).  On this basis, mineral rents are redistributed to 
local governments to pay for poverty reduction programs as well as infrastructure and 
social services such as roads, power grids, education, healthcare and water sanitation 
(Pedro, 2006: 4-5).   
The,Alternative,View:,The,Resource,Curse,
 Among criticisms against mineral export-based development model are those who 
assent to the “resource curse” literature, the primary challenger to the view that mining 
contributes to development.  Critics against the pro-mining view point to the resource 
curse literature, who argue that strong empirical evidence suggest resource endowed 
countries perform surprisingly less than the resource-poor countries (Ross, 1999; Sachs 
and Warner, 2001). The main message of the resource curse, as portrayed by Birdsall and 
Subramanian (2004), is that “[n]atural resources may seem like manna from heaven at 
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first, providing new states the means to escape poverty and invest in schools and roads … 
More often, however, such riches prove a curse.” (p.80).   
The curse referred to is the phenomenon that resource-rich countries do not 
benefit from the opportunities provided by resource wealth; instead, they experience 
worse outcomes in economic development and poor governance than those with less 
natural resources (Humphreys et al., 2007: 1).  The resource curse gained notoriety as 
empirical evidence accumulated in the late 1980s showing that mineral dependent 
economies negatively affect the country’s economic, social and political development 
(Pegg, 2003: 8). The negative effects of natural resources tend to be more acute with 
‘point resources’ such as minerals than ‘diffuse resources’ that are not fixed (Arellano-
Yanguas, 2008; Bulte et al., 2005; Stevens and Dietsche, 2008). Economically, studies 
found that developing countries dependent on mineral extraction have experienced little 
or no economic growth.  According to Auty and Mikesell (1998), between 1960 and 
1990, the GDP per capital in mineral-rich countries increased on average of 1.7 percent 
compared to the higher 2.5 to 3.5 percent growth in mineral-poor countries (cited in 
Weinthal and Luong, 2006: 36).  Mineral-export countries also incur greater debt 
resulting in higher percentage of earnings for servicing debt (ibid, p.36).  For example, 
out of the thirty-six countries in the World Bank’s highly indebted low-income countries, 
27 are primary commodity exporters (Ross, 1999: 322).  Politically, countries 
experiencing the resource curse exhibit various forms of weak governance, resulting in 
rampant levels of corruption, authoritarian regimes (Collier and Hoeffler, 2009) and 
conflicts (Ballard and Banks, 2003; Le Billon, 2001).  Found at the bottom of the list in 
the World Bank Governance Research Indicators and Transparency International 
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Corruption Perception Index are mineral dependent developing countries (Weinthal and 
Luong, 2006: 36).   
Resource wealth also has adverse effects on wellbeing.  Contrary to the view that 
mining reduces poverty, mineral wealth has been linked to low levels of human 
development combined with high levels of poverty, child mortality, and inequality 
(Humphreys et al., 2007: 2; Ross, 2001).  The combination of these negative outcome 
surmount to what Bebbington et al. (2008) describe the mining and development 
relationship as “contentious and ambiguous”.7  The authors’ ambivalence toward mining 
and development characterizes the divisive “resource curse” debate.   
The resource curse underscores the difficulties of managing mineral wealth for 
growth and development.  Scholars and practitioners alike now accept that there is no 
direct causal relationship (i.e. mining does not directly affect growth).  Arguments against 
a direct causal relationship is on the basis that some resource-rich in the Global South 
have benefited, such as Bostwana, Chile, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand (Gylfason, 
2001; Davis and Tilton, 2005).  Daniele (2010) argues that the presence of natural 
resources alone does not contribute to poor development; rather, development effects vary 
depending on how resources are used and not the resources themselves. 
Thus, the resource curse only occurs when intervening factors that influence and 
mediate mining’s impact on economic growth and development is not addressed.  Over 
the past decades, a number of causal mechanisms, or channels, have been explored to 
explain why export countries have not benefited from resource wealth.  The debate on 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7!The authors describe the relationship between mining and development as “contentious” 
because majority of the local populations experience negative socio-economic and environmental 
effects.  This relationship is “ambiguous” because the mining, if done right, local population may 
be able to benefit much more (p.887).!!!
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explanations for the resource curse is best explained by Saches and Warner (2001): “Just 
as we lack a universally accepted theory of economic growth in general, we lack a 
universally accepted theory of the curse of natural resources.” (p.833).  Despite a 
universally accepted theory, there is consensus that the curse occurs through the 
“crowding-out logic”.  The “crowding-out logic” recognizes intervening variables that 
mediate mining’s impact on development.  The logic suggests that “natural resources 
crowd-out activity x”, and if it is activity x that determines growth then natural resources 
harms growth (ibid, p.833).  The following sections provide an overview of the 
explanations for the negative effects of the curse in relation to the economy, governance 
and politics, and social and human development.   
Economic(Transmission(Channels((
Declining(Terms(of(Trade(and(Economic(Linkages((
Early attempts to explain resource curse focused on the economics of resource 
extraction, specifically the role of macroeconomics as the reason, or causal mechanism, 
for slower growth (Stevens and Dietsche, 2008: 57). For economists, resource wealth did 
not contribute to an improved economy because of a number of mechanisms: declining 
terms of trade (Prebisch, 1964); volatile markets (Shaxson, 2005); economic linkages 
(Hirschman, 1958), and the Dutch Disease (Davis and Tilton, 2005: Stevens and 
Dietsche, 2008).  While the resource curse terminology was not officially term until the 
late 1980s, a small minority of economists known as structuralists debated against 
resource-export development strategy since the 1950s.  According to the Prebisch-Singer 
thesis, structuralists pointed out the imbalances in terms of trade between the North and 
the South, and that the gap would only widen if countries exported of primary 
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commodities (Ross, 1999: 301).  Contrary to the doctrine of comparative advantage 
(Bauer and Yamey, 1957; MacBean 1966), Prebisch (1964) predicted a downward trend 
in the terms of trade for primary commodities when compared to import of manufactured 
goods using the capital generated from commodity export (cited in Auty, 2003: 2).  It has 
been suggested that due to the competitive nature of primary commodity markets, over 
time mineral-economies have to export more for the same manufactured import (Davis 
and Tilton, 2005: 235).  As Ross (1999) explains, increases to commodity exports created 
by global events such as the debt crisis and waves of structural adjustment programs 
(SAPs) in much of the developing countries confirmed Prebisch’s hypothesis: resource-
export countries experienced significant drop in terms of trade for primary commodities 
in the 1980s (p.302).  On the basis that capital are generated by resource-export to help 
pay for manufacture imports, structuralists advocated for ISI to protect infant industries 
and to meet domestic market demands.   
Other structuralists such as Hirschman (1958) attribute the lack of economic 
growth to the following: 1) the vulnerability of the mineral-export economies to the sharp 
fluctuation in global commodity prices, and 2) the enclave nature of mining sector and its 
inability to link with rest of economic sectors (cited in Bulte et al., 2005: 1030).  On the 
issue of volatility, commodities prices are vulnerable to the industry’s bust-and-boom 
cycle, a function of global demand and consumption patterns.  Commodity prices are 
volatile not only when demand and prices are low, but also during upsurges when 
increase demand hikes prices.  Consequently, “[m]arket instability makes it difficult for 
developing countries to count on revenues from the mineral sector, and hampers the 
effective planning needed for economic development (Davis and Tilton, 2005: 236).  
Since the 1960s, economists have debated the effects of unstable markets and instability 
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in commodity prices have on growth.  More recent studies show that “export instability 
either harms economic growth or has no impact at all.” (Ross, 1999: 304).  However, 
even if export instability is controlled, commodity-export economies still suffer from 
slow growth (ibid, p.304-305).   
Second, opportunities for creation of direct mining jobs and indirect jobs in other 
related sectors are minimal.  This contradicts WBG and mining supporters’ argument that 
the industry creates numerous jobs and incomes for growth for poverty reduction.  
Structuralists contend that the mining sector generates very few jobs due to its capital-
intensive, as oppose to labour intensive, nature.  For example, Pegg (2006) points out that 
for every $700,000 spent on the Sadiola gold mine in Mali, only one job is created 
(p.380).  The number of employed at a mine-site tend to fluctuate with more employed 
during the construction phase, and reduces dramatically once the mine is operating 
(World Bank, 2013b: 199). Appendix C highlights the capital-intensive nature of mining 
(i.e. investment percentage of GDP), and providing far less jobs once mine construction is 
complete.   
Already limited by the very few job opportunities available, local economies do 
not benefit from the mine because many mining jobs are for highly skilled, expatriate 
workers from the North (Sampat, 2003: 122-123).  And according to the International 
Labour Organization (ILO), despite the growth in global mineral production, there has 
been declining rates of employment in the mining sector (cited in Sampat, 2003: 119).   
Mining not only generate few direct employment opportunities, but Hirschman 
(1958) argued that the sector acts as an “enclave economy” that contributes little to the 
rest of the economy through backward and forward linkages.  Domestic linkages are 
limited as supplies, equipment and personnel are imported from established global mining 
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suppliers elsewhere, and the mined ores and concentrates are exported abroad for value-
added processing (Davis and Tilton, 2005: Auty, 2006).8  A key promoter and financier of 
the mining industry, the World Bank’s own World Development Report recently stated 
that the direct and indirect creation of jobs from mining account for no more than one or 
two percent of total employment in mineral economies (World Bank, 2013b: 199).  The 
“enclave” nature of the industry also impedes growth in rest of the economy when foreign 
MNCs dominate the sector.  Although some see MNCs as important contributors in 
economic development via taxes, royalties, and job creation, the Hirschman (1958) thesis 
disputes MNCs’ contributions to economic development on the basis of the industry’s 
“enclave nature”.  Of equal importance is the repatriation of MNC’s profits back to its 
home country rather than investing in local economies (Ross, 1999: 301-302).    
Despite substantial empirical evidence cautioning against mineral-export 
development strategy, UNECA and other international organizations have renewed calls 
for commodity-based industrialization, specifically for mining to serve as Africa’s 
“engine of growth” (African Union, 2009; UNECA, 2013).  For example, in its 2013 
report, Making the Most of Africa’s Commodities, UNECA states that current 
globalization trends dispels the declining terms-of-trade between commodities and 
manufactured goods.  The report also suggests that with short- and long-term comparative 
advantages, Africa’s escape out of the resource curse is possible under the right industrial 
framework policies aimed at reducing “… inequality, promote job creation and increase 
social protection to make growth more conducive to social development.” (UNECA, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 In the case of the mining industry in Ghana, Larsen et al. (2009) study examined recent changes 
to the globalized gold mining industry within the country and suggest that the weak linkages were 
quite weak as supplies, equipment and contracts were imported, and processing of ore are 
exported to the Rand Refinery in South Africa   
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2013: 26).  Twenty years later after his initial “enclave economy thesis” in 1956, 
Hirschman (1981) and his predecessors have argued that linkages are possible, but will 
require time to be developed.  UNECA (2013) further contend that once the linkages are 
established, direct and indirect jobs related to the mining sector can be realized (p.75).   
Dutch(Disease(
Another economic explanation for the resource curse is the Dutch Disease, a term 
coined from the poor performance of Netherland’s manufacturing sector after huge 
natural gas reserves were discovered in the North Sea (Humphreys et al., 2007: 5). 
According to the Dutch Disease, export-based mineral economies experiencing resource 
boom suffer from two effects: first, real exchange rate increases as a result of large 
inflows of foreign exchange generated by resource exports; and second, absorption of 
production input (i.e. capital and labour) into mining sector from other productive sectors, 
primarily agriculture and manufacturing, that have been the foundation of developing 
economies (Ross, 1999: 306; Weinthal and Luong, 2006).  These effects impedes 
economic growth as overvalued exchange rates hinders the international competitiveness 
of the economy, and “crowd-out” agriculture and manufacturing sectors as it struggles to 
compete with higher salaries and wages in the mining sector (Davis and Tilton, 2005: 
236).   
Due to mining’s enclave nature and tendency to divert capital and labour into the 
booming sector, the implications on development are two-fold: economic stagnation in 
the short-term as agricultural and manufacturing exports contracts due to higher cost 
(Bulte et al., 2005: 1030; Weinthal and Luong, 2006: 37)9, and precipitate into economic 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Weinthal and Luong (2006) cites other studies that shows how economic growth is stunted by a 
declining manufacturing sector.  See Birdsall et al. (2001) and Gylfason (2001).   
! 27!
collapse in the long-term once the resource boom is over (Davis and Tilton, 2005: 236; 
Weinthal and Luong, 2006: 37).  Thus, the culprit in Sachs and Warner’s (2001) 
“crowding-out logic” is the appreciation of real exchange rate and shifting production 
inputs (Weinthal and Luong, 2006: 37).   
Social(Transmission(Channels(( (
Contrary to the view that mineral wealth contributes to poverty reduction and 
provides opportunities to meet Millennium Development Goals such as achieve primary 
education and reduce child mortality (e.g. ICMM, 2012: 6), the resource curse literature 
reveals a strong correlation between mineral dependence and higher levels of poverty 
(Ross, 2001; Pegg, 2003; Bush, 2007: 131).  It also highlights negative relationship 
between mineral wealth and low rankings on the human development indicators, as well 
as chronic shortages of investment on education and healthcare (Birdsall et al., 2000; 
Gylfason, 2001; Ross, 2001; Stevens and Dietsche, 2008).  While the resource curse is 
traditionally narrowly defined as slow to negative economic growth, Bulte et al. (2005) 
and others suggests that the curse has far-reaching “spill over” detriments to human 
welfare.   
Education,(Health(and(Human(Development(((
Ross’s (2001) study on the impact of mining on poverty found that as more 
minerals are exported out of the country, the standards of living and levels of poverty in 
the country worsens (p.8).  For example, countries that rely on mining with more than 
thirty percent for export income happen to represent some of the world’s poorest 
impoverished nations (Sampat, 2003: 120).  Instead of moving up the United Nation’s 
HDI rankings, resource-rich countries like Zambia, Zimbabwe and Kazakhstan fell in the 
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rankings between 1990 and 1998 (Ross, 2001: 8).  Ross’s (2001) assessment of the 
linkages between mineral dependence and HDI reveal that the conditions of the poor are 
worse off, and suffer from high rates of child mortality, increased vulnerability to shocks, 
income inequality, poor healthcare, and low levels of education (p.8).  Ross (2001) 
concludes that children in resource-rich countries, using HDI’s infant mortality and life 
expectancy indicators, are likely to suffer from higher mortality rates and shortened life-
span (ibid p.11).  Similarly, Bulte et al. (2005) argue that not only is economic growth a 
poor indicator of development, resource wealth countries also score lower on human 
development.  They further explain that this occurs in absence of good institutions, an 
important aspect of resource curse to be discussed later.  
The importance of state investments into public sectors such as education and 
health for poverty eradication is discussed in 2001 World Development Report (World 
Bank, 2001).  As the Bank explains, poverty and wellbeing of the poor can be improved 
by increasing education that leads to better health, which increases opportunities to 
engage in income generating activities (ibid, 2001: v).  Industry supporters point out that 
minerals once extracted can be converted into human capital by investing revenues to 
improve access to school enrollment, and healthcare in order to achieve economic 
development. (Davis and Tilton, 2005: 233).   
Just as mineral dependence is correlated with low poverty indicators, education-
related indicators point to reduced expenditures on education, low enrollment, poor 
school performances, and low adult literacy (Pegg, 2003: 14).  Birdsall et al. (2000) 
explains that on average, resource-rich countries are known to invest less in assets such as 
education, which limits the rate of return on human capital necessary for higher 
productivity and lower inequality to achieve economic growth and rapid development.  In 
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using the “crowding-out logic”, Gylfason (2001) explains that the crowding-out of human 
capital like education is the reason for poor economic performances. Education 
contributes to economic development because it improved people’s lives in many ways, 
such as better labour efficiency, fostering of democracy for good governance, better 
health, and greater equality (Gylfason, 2001: 851).  Therefore, if investments into 
education are reduced, then the economy slows. In a statistical review of data carried out 
by Gylfason (2001) between 1980 to 1997, he reveals the following educational trends for 
mineral rich countries: first, decreases in public expenditure on education; second, 
decreasing enrollment for girls; and decrease secondary school enrollment.  As to why 
mining’s impact on education slows economic growth, the study suggests that the mining 
industry require labour that is less high-skill, and when once released (for example, 
during the bust cycle) workers have less relevant education and experience for other 
industries (Gylfason, 2001: 855).  However, if investment into higher quality education 
increases, Birdsall et al. (2000) argues that the human capital of the poor expands and can 
become an “engine of growth”.   
Environment  
Another reason for poor social performances of mineral-dependent counties (i.e. 
poor living conditions and persistent poverty) stems from the environmental and social 
costs of mineral extraction on local communities and their livelihoods (Bush, 2007: 132).  
Historically, the industry has garnered a “devil may care’ attitude toward its impact on the 
environment (Jenkins, 2004: 24).  To this day, this remains unchanged in many parts of 
the world.  This pervasive attitude places communities in a precarious predicament, as 
encounters between MNCs and rural poor communities (and often times indigenous 
groups) are increasingly a reality, and once isolated regions are now open to mineral 
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exploration and development (Haalboom, 2012: 969; Jenkins 2004: 24).  For example, 
according to Gifford et al. (2010) roughly about seventy percent of gold mining projects 
are found in the Global South where lax environmental regulations present far greater risk 
to local communities (p.304).  
Although large-scale mining projects may present benefits and opportunities, 
more likely than not mining leaves a “lasting mark on people and landscapes around the 
world” (Sampat, 2003: 111).   Mining activities are reported to move more materials than 
rivers move each year, and a single mine like Ok Tedi in Papua New Guinea generates on 
average 200,000 tons of waste a day, which is more than the waste generated by Japan, 
Australia and Canada combined (ibid, p.111).  The industry is also a major contributor to 
climate change, from the perspective that the industry only contributes to one percent of 
global GDP, but its global energy consumption is roughly seven to ten and responsible for 
thirteen percent of sulphur dioxide emissions (Cardiff and Sampat, 2007 cited in 
Bebbington et al., 2008: 893).  For example, copper smelters in Zambia emit 300,000 to 
700,00 tons per year of sulphur dioxide, affecting tens of thousands of local residents 
through leaching of lead in the soil and smoke inhalation (Pegg, 2006: 378).   
Impacts to communities are the greatest in areas if mineral deposits are located 
below community.  Communities are often dispossessed from their lands and traditional 
livelihoods, and forced to relocate as large tracts of agricultural land become destroyed.  
Marginalized groups such as indigenous groups have borne the brunt of mining projects 
(Ballard and Banks, 2003: 298), and women whose sole livelihood is dependent on 
agriculture often fall into extreme poverty (Bush, 2007: 130).  The litany of negative 
impacts of mining projects on local communities is well documented, which inevitably 
exacerbate vulnerability of the poor and marginalized groups to economic, environmental 
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and social risks.  Generally, new mines are accompanied by influx of new migrants in 
search of job and may lead to increased incidence of communicable diseases and 
infections (Pegg, 2003: 14); marginalization and discrimination of local populations; and 
the industry’s masculinity can limit employment opportunities to women who already 
suffered the loss of land and livelihood for income (Ballard and Banks: 2003: 301).  
Political(Transmission(Channels(
More recent explanations of the resource curse emphasize political economy of 
mineral economies and the role of the government and state institutions in managing 
adverse effects of mineral resources (Stevens and Dietsche, 2008). The political 
dimensions of the resource curse emerge from the troubled question of why states 
repeatedly fail to implement policy measures to counter the economic transmission 
mechanisms to ensure resource wealth are assets for development (Ross, 1998; Stevens 
and Dietsche, 2008).  Political scientists propose that decisions made by governments to 
pursue poor policies is best understood as a political and institutional problem, rather than 
an economic one (Karl, 2007: 256).  As this section illustrates, while empirical studies 
have highlighted the direct links between resources and the negative economic, social and 
political under-achievements, there is an indirect link in which institutions play a role to 
regulate and govern the negative effects of mineral dependency.   
Rent<Seeking(and(the(Staple(Trap(Model((( 
 One political explanation for the poor economic performance is rent-seeking, a 
behaviour governments engage in in pursuit of rents from export of primary products 
such as minerals.  Reliance on rents generated by MNCs means that states avoid tax 
collection as its primary source of government revenue.  According to Karl (2007: 262), 
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this has two developmental effects.  First, reliance on MNCs means high levels of 
external intervention that may influence domestic affairs.  Second, by not taxing the 
population, states are less accountable and relieved of the pressure form 
“bureaucratically, efficacious, authoritative, liberal, and ultimately democratic states” 
(ibid, p.262). 
The staple trap model has also been applied to explain the disappointing 
developmental outcomes of many countries in Latin America, Sub-Sahara Africa and the 
Middle East.  According to the staple theory, the trap rentier states fall into is the 
overreliance of rents generated from mineral exports for industrialization (Auty, 2001: 
843).  States become entangled in the staple trap when rents are redistributed and spent on 
non-tradable sector for industrialization and non-productive sectors such as government 
services (ibid p.844).  The priorities placed on both sectors means that the economy is 
“locked into a staple trap of increasing dependence on commodities with declining 
competitiveness as ongoing structural change shrinks the share of the primary sector in 
GDP and the protected manufacturing sector fails to mature” (ibid p.844-845).  But if 
industries progress and mature alongside a bourgeoning public sector and government 
services, the state will become more dependent on rent generated by the primary sector, 
inevitably outstrip resource rents and destroy incentives for reinvesting in the economy 
for development (Auty, 2003: 5).  As Auty (2003) explains, “The result is a weakened 
economy that is vulnerable to a growth collapse.” (p.5).   
Corruption(and(Democracy(
Another effect of a rentier state is corruption.  This relates to the literature that 
argues natural resource reduces economic growth if individuals in power engage in 
inefficient decision-making such as rent seeking activities (Weinthal and Luong, 2006: 
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38; Stevens and Dietsche, 2008; Bhattacharyya and Hodler, 2010).  Auty (2001) argues 
that resource abundant countries with point resources such as minerals or oil fields tend to 
be dominated by predatory governments that enact ‘bad policies’ to promote and satisfy 
narrow interests and political constituents (cited in Bulte et al., 2005: 1031; Stevens and 
Dietsche, 2008: 57).  Rentier states can also prop up “bad” governments because taxes are 
lowered as their source of revenue comes from rent generated from mineral exports.  As a 
result, resource rents and the low taxes work to undermine the demand for political 
representation (Stevens and Dietsche, 2008: 57)10 as governments are less accountable to 
the society (Ross, 1999: 312).   
Collier and Hoeffler (2009) argue that “With an unconstrained government, 
electoral competition drives an economy into patronage politics” (p.299).  Thus, this type 
of state-societal relations in resource rich countries curtails economic growth.  
Governments may opt to redistribute rent to its political constituent in order to maintain 
power.  Sometimes predatory governments also engage in unproductive activities such as 
employing internal security force to control opposition groups (Stevens and Dietsche, 
2008: 57).   
 The rentier state explanation of the link between resource rent and poor economic 
management is agency-based, which attributes the poor judgment of government officials 
as “myopic”, or short-sightedness (Ross, 1999: 312, Stevens and Dietsche, 2008: 57). 
Those that are in position of power – both politicians and bureaucrats – may take personal 
advantage and engage in rent seeking and corrupt business behaviour that are not only 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 Stevens & Dietsche (2008) points to two types of explanations as to why governments poorly 
manage the economy and pursue bad economic policies.  They are structural and agency-based.  
Structural explanation emphasizes the structure of government and how political regimes are able 
to engage in rent-seeking behaviour at the detriment of economy.   
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unproductive and inefficient to the economy, but rob the public of the resource wealth 
that could be redistributed (Stevens and Dietsche, 2008: 57).   For example, authorities 
enticed by bonuses may favour one company over another with detrimental effect on 
revenue and economic growth over time (Karl, 2007: 266).   
Natural(Resource(Funds((
 While ample of empirical evidence point to the existence of the “resource curse”, 
the literature also provides a number of recommendations and pathways for avoiding the 
curse.  One recommendation commonly proposed is the establishment of natural resource 
funds (NRFs) aimed at improving management and expenditures of resource revenues by 
the state.  In essence, NRFs serve as stabilization and savings funds11 to ensure that when 
commodity prices are high, overspending of excess revenue are reduced; and when prices 
are low, savings from excess revenue are used to compensate for budgetary shortfalls 
(Weinthal and Luong, 2006: 40).  As described by Birdsall and Subramanian (2004: 85), 
the funds can stabilize a country’s spending by saving up during the “fat years” (i.e. high 
commodity prices), so that future generations can benefit from the savings during the not 
so prosperous years.  
 NRF leads to better fiscal policy, economic growth and contributes to 
development by discouraging rent-seeking behaviour through two ways: first, high levels 
of transparency and rules on expenditures for social investment and public goods (Arthur, 
2006a; Humphreys and Sandbu, 2007); and secondly, cash transfer schemes whereby 
resource revenues are transferred to and paid to citizens of the country on a monthly basis 
(Standing and Hilson, 2013).  Two successful implementation of NRFs for the 
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11 Stabilization funds are intended to minimize the economic impact of price volatility, and 
savings fund helps ensure that mineral revenues are saved for future generations, especially when 
minerals have been extracted and depleted (Weinthal and Luong, 2006: 40).   
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development and benefit of peoples are the State Petroleum Fund in Norway and the 
Alaska Permanent Fund, where there was public involvement over decisions that resulted 
in direct cash redistribution program (Weinthal and Luong, 2006: 40).  Increasingly 
advocated by the WB and the IMF, NRF’s popularity have grown among developing 
countries and are found in countries like Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Chad, Iran and more 
recently Mongolia (Humphreys and Sandbu, 2007; Weinthal and Luong, 2006: 40).   
 Arthur (2012) argues that sole reliance on the NRF to avoid the resource curse can 
be problematic.  Countries such as Chad, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan with own NRFs 
show that countries that lack public accountability, transparency, checks and balances, 
and democracy can result in revenues misused by politicians for personal gains rather 
than social programs and projects (ibid, p.114).  NRFs’ effectiveness, according to 
Weinthal and Luong (2006), require strong state institutions that have a functioning 
bureaucracy and independent judiciary that are both separate from the executive and 
emphasize oversight, transparency and accountability (p.40).  Checks and balances are 
important because while NRFs can serve to restrain government over-expenditure, the 
funds can be stripped when governments change the rules to increase expenditure 
(Humphreys and Sandbu, 2007: 195).  For these reasons, Humphreys and Sandbu (2007) 
argue that NRF is not a panacea for the curse, because the political economy of power 
that provides political actors the incentives to overspend is not addressed.  They suggest 
that NRFs can be made more effective through the following: strict rules and regulations 
for use of resource fund; representation of interests over diverse political constituencies; 
and lastly, high levels of transparency over use of funds, including budgetary process, 
reporting of payments and investments (ibid, 2007).   
Transparency and Accountability  
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Recent studies in the resource curse literature suggest that it is the lack of 
transparency, accountability and availability of information over management of resource 
payments that explains why resource wealth do not benefit the poor (Gary and Karl, 
2003; Idemudia, 2009; Karl, 2007).  This is based on the assumption that greater 
transparency regarding government earnings from resource revenues will lead to 
governments to be held more accountable over how the revenue is spent and curb 
corruption (Idemudia, 2009: 4).  This is now widely accepted as international NGOs 
together with IFIs have encouraged both MNCs and host country governments to publish 
information regarding resource payments (e.g. taxes, fees, royalties) and how revenues 
are spent (Weinthal and Luong, 2006: 41).  Most notable example of global efforts to 
improve transparency began with the “Publish What you pay” campaign calling for 
MNCs to disclose payments made to host governments (Herringshaw, 2004).  This 
international effort then laid the foundation for the establishment of the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), calling for host governments to do the same 
(Hilson and Maconachie, 2009: 55).  By making this information public, it is assumed 
that transparency helps to combat the resource curse as information leads to monitoring 
and participation by the general population (Karl, 2007).   
Governance and Institutions  
Effectiveness of NRFs, transparency and accountability depend on institutional 
quality.  The role of institutions in combating the resource curse have gained momentum 
as economic explanations have repeatedly failed to explain government’s 
mismanagement of the economy and failure to alleviate plight of the poor.  Institutional 
quality is increasingly diagnosed as determining factor in whether resource economies 
avoid the resource curse (Mehlum et al., 2006; Stevens and Dietsche, 2008).  Scholars 
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contest that strong institutions ensures growth and development are possible by limiting 
the negative economic, political and social consequences of rent-seeking behaviour 
(Stevens and Dietsche, 2008).  For example, Mehlum et al. (2006) analysis of empirical 
data show that the effects of the resource curse are weaker the greater the institutional 
quality in countries; and the curse disappears in countries with high institutional quality 
(p.13).  Steven and Dietsche (2008) suggest that where institutions are strong, politicians 
are less incline to use patronage for political gains; conversely, perverse political 
behaviour is likely to dominate where weak institutions exist (p.60).  Good institutions 
also enhance the effects of resource fund, transparency and accountability by ensuring 
that checks and balances, political representation and good governance are in place.   
The consensus on institutions and resource curse is not why institutions are 
important in preventing the curse, but rather what institutional arrangements are desirable 
and how to build these institutions. Mehlum et al.’s (2006) study reveals that countries 
with “producer friendly” institutions determine whether the country benefits from its 
mineral wealth.  By using a quality index to measure a country’s institutions in terms of 
its rule of law, bureaucratic quality, corruption, risk, and contractual arrangements, 
countries that scored high do not show symptoms of the resource curse (Mehlum et al., 
2006).  These countries are said to exhibit “producer friendly” institutional arrangement 
that attracts entrepreneurs for production without experiencing resource curse (i.e. hinder 
economic growth).12  Countries whose institution have weak rule of law, malfunctioning 
bureaucracy and corruption are described as “grabber institutions” and exhibit slow 
economic growth and unproductive activities (Mehlum et al., 2006: 3).  Similarly, Bulte 
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12 Mehlum et al.’s (2006) is also an important contribution to the literature as it demonstrates that 
institutions is a decisive factor in the resource curse, contrary to earlier claims by Sachs and 
Warner that institutions is not an important factor.    
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et al. (2005) argue that when controlling for institutional quality, such as rule of law (i.e. 
protection of property rights and role of judiciary) and government effectiveness (i.e. 
government capacity, civil service, and policy enforcement), the direct effect on 
economic growth disappears.  For Weinthal and Luong (2006), an important feature that 
distinguishes institutional quality lies with privatization of domestic ownership over state-
ownership of mineral wealth.  They contend that only under this scenario will 
governments have incentives to build strong fiscal and regulatory institutions that will 
generate revenue from the private owners who are responsible for maintaining steady 
income stream (p.43).13   
Few have attempted to explain how to induce or strengthen institutional change 
when it is widely absent in the developing countries remains debated.  For example, 
Collier and Hoeffler (2009) suggest that checks and balances can be introduced by 
taxation, because citizens will hold political actors more accountable and effective 
(p.299).  Similarly, Karl (2007) notes that unless citizens pays taxes to the state, they will 
not be engaged and motivated to ensure that revenues are well spent, and demand 
monitoring of how revenues are utilized (p.264).  Others like Bebbington et al. (2009) 
proposes that good institutions may only emerge in the presence of social conflict that 
demands for institutional change.  Conflicts that challenges the asymetries of power can 
facilitate building of institutions that builds synergies between mining, livelihoods of the 
poor, and development, in favour of local sustainability (Bebbington et al., 2009: 17,296).  
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13 The authors contend that state-ownership of mineral resources is only successful if 
transparency, accountability and oversight are encouraged by existing institutions, which is often 
not the case.  State-ownership also does not create incentives for governments to create conditions 
for limiting the state in areas of fiscal autonomy and decision-making powers.   
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Scholars such as Arthur (2012), Hilson and Maconachie (2009) and Idemudia 
(2009) argue that institutions must emphasize “good governance” to reduce corruption, 
improve how of resource revenues are spent and invested in order to avoid the curse.  
Arthur (2012) defines “good governance” as democratic system of governance based on 
accountable and transparent systems across all levels of government, in combination with 
system of checks and balances.  A democratic governance system is important in 
curtailing abuse of power and misuse of revenue by authoritative and corrupt 
governments, as well as ensuring transparency on social and environmental issues 
(Arthur, 2012).  Hilson and Maconachies (2009) highlight the widespread corrupt, 
authoritarian rule across Sub-Sahara Africa, and argue that “good governance” require 
unique set of institutional changes to overcome the various different challenges presented 
by the different types of resources.14  Whatever the institutional change, citizens need to 
be able to hold their governments accountable for abuse of power, rent-seeking, and any 
other forms of corrosive political behaviours (Hilson and Maconachie, 2009: 91).  The 
dangers of a one-size fits all approach in addressing governance failures is described by 
Idemudia (2009) as the “governance-failure complex”, where overreliance on 
transparency linked with accountability are often inappropriately diagnosed as ways out 
of the resource curse.  Idemudia’s (2009) governance approach attributes “… Africa’s 
colonial history, its weakness in international political economy, its poor leadership, its 
heterogeneous society, and its overdependence on natural resources.” (p.13).  These 
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14 Hilson and Maconachie (2009) discuss the various resource curse challenges facing petro-
economies (i.e. oil-dependent states), lootable economies (e.g. easily accessible minerals such as 
gemstones and diamonds in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Madagascar and the Democratic of Republic of 
Congo) and conventional mineral producers (e.g. Ghana, Tanzania and Zambia).  All three 
categories are said to suffer from various socio-political negative outcomes of the resource curse, 
and requires unique set of institutional changes to overcome the curse.     
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variables intervene to explain why mineral wealth and revenues have not been 
redistributed and translated to development.  Appropriate institutional changes, according 
to Idemudia (2009), are “compatible cultural democracy, the strengthening of the 
institution of checks and balances, and the diversification of civil society’s strategies for 
engaging the state, active engagement with microcorporate and macrocorporate 
citizenship issues by TNCs, and the international regulation of socioenvironmental 
impacts of the activities of TNCs”.15   
CSR:,A,New,Approach,to,Combating,Resource,Curse,,
To add to the debate on mining’s “contentious and ambiguous” relationship with 
development (Bebbington et al., 2008), CSR – a relatively new sub-literature of mining 
and development – has further widened the rift between the view that mining can 
contribute to development, and the resource curse view.  Globally, CSR is increasingly 
viewed as beneficial to development across various industries, and has been applied to the 
extractive resource sector by arguing that mining CSR contributes to growth and 
development.  The solutions described previously for avoiding the resource curse also 
manifest in the CSR agenda.  For reasons discussed in this section, CSR is promoted as a 
new approach for steering the industry toward sustainable development and poverty 
reduction, capable of overcoming the mechanisms lead to the resource curse (Dansereau, 
2010: 65; Pegg, 2012).  As this section illustrates, CSR appears to incorporate 
recommended solutions for avoiding the resource curse literature, such as “good 
governance”, resource funds, social development programs, and economic diversification.  
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15 TNCs stands for transnational corporations.  TNCs are used interchangeably with MNCs 
(multinational corporations).  For the purpose of this thesis, MNCs has been used throughout.   
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The key difference, however, is the voluntary approach promoted by the private sector in 
delivering the solutions (Ruggie, 2002).   
CSR(Definitions((
Although the term CSR is a relatively new “buzzword” (Utting, 2005: 375), the 
concept is not.  The concept is concerned with business-society relationship.  For 
instance, CSR describes the relationship between “business ethics and the social 
dimensions of business activity …”, and this can be traced back to Cicero in the first 
century B.C., or in more modern times, the boycott of products made by slave labour in 
the nineteenth-century (Blowfield and Frynas, 2005: 500).  It was not until the 1950s, 
however, that any formal writing on CSR began, and has since evolved.  CSR is 
synonymous with ‘social responsibility’, and the first publication on the subject was 
Howard R. Bowen’s book titled Social Responsibilities of the Businessman in 1953 
(Carroll, 1999: 269).  Presently, CSR is just the latest manifestation of earlier debates 
over the relationship between business and society (Blowfield and Frynas, 2005: 500).   
This debate has ebbed and flowed reflecting the rise of corporations extending their 
control and influence, and society attempting to regulate corporate power (Jenkins, 2005: 
526).  
Although concerned with the social responsibility of businesses and its operations, 
there is no accepted definition, nor a consensus on the issues that CSR may cover 
(Blowfield and Frynas 2005; UNECA, 2011: 81).  Farmer and Hogue (1973) suggest that 
arriving at a consensual definition is difficult, because social responsibility reflects an 
individual’s moral value (cited in Idemudia, 2008: 95).  However, a commonly cited 
definition within business circles is World Business Council on Sustainable Development 
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(WBCSD).  The organization defines CSR as "the continuing commitment by business to 
contribute to economic development while improving the quality of life of the workforce 
and their families as well as of the community and society at large." (WBCSD, 1998).16  
As with most other CSR definitions, it is described as a process of integrating social 
concerns into business’s policies and operations (UNECA, 2011: 81).   
The lack of, or the broad definition of, CSR has allowed many interpretation of 
the concept for different reasons (Blowfield and Frynas, 2005: 503).  And without a 
universal definition, for example, corporations at the management level are often dealing 
with wide range of issues ranging from animal rights, corporate governance, 
environmental management, corporate philanthropy, stakeholder management, labour 
rights and community development (ibid p.501).  Equally problematic is that new terms 
such as corporate accountability, socially responsible investment and sustainable 
development have been added to business-society debate to replacing, redefining or 
complementing the CSR concept, (ibid p.501).  A more useful approach, suggest 
Blowfield and Frynas (2005), is to consider CSR as an umbrella term that considers the 
following elements:  
(a) that companies have a responsibility for their impact on society and the 
natural environment, sometimes beyond legal compliance and the liability of 
individuals; (b) that companies have a responsibility for the behaviour of 
others with whom they do business (e.g. within supply chains); and (c) that 
business needs to manage its relationship with wider society, whether for 
reasons of commercial viability or to add value to society.” (p.503).   
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16 Blowfield and Frynas (2005), however, point out that this definition was later revised in 2002 to 
“the commitment of business to contribute to sustainable economic development, working with 
employees, their families, the local community and society at large to improve their quality of 
life” (p.501).  The significance of evolving definition is not which one is correct, but that 
institutions and individuals have their own interpretations of CSR (Blowfield and Frynas, 2005: 
501).   
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Similarly, in the mining industry Hamann (2003) describes the sector’s interpretation of 
CSR responsibility as “maximizing the positive and minimizing the negative social and 
environmental impacts of mining, while maintaining profits: in short, contributing to 
sustainable development.” (p.237-238).   
The CSR agenda is also gaining momentum in international development.  Policy-
makers see the importance of business in meeting development challenges.  These include 
economic growth, combating HIV/AIDS, and poverty reduction (Blowfield and Frynas, 
2005).  Multinational organizations such as the UN and the World Bank, government 
agencies, NGOs and businesses, to some extent, all view business involvement through 
CSR as increasingly important in development.  For example, the United Kingdom’s 
Department for International Development’s (DFID) CSR definition makes clear its view 
on private-sector led growth: “By following socially responsible practices, the growth 
generated by the private sector will be more inclusive, equitable and poverty reducing.” 
(Jenkins, 2005: 525). The emphasis on private-sector marks a significant change as 
businesses are viewed as “engine of economic growth” for the benefit of everyone 
(Blowfield, 2005: 515).  As Blowfield (2005) points out, this reflects the new thinking of 
bringing in businesses into the development circle, rather than ignoring or viewing them 
as problematic by development experts (p.516).17  Other factor for the change in 
perception of CSR and development, one being the shift away from the understanding of 
“development” as primarily driven by economic growth toward social indicators such as 
HDI and the UN MDGs (Jenkins, 2005: 528).  Another important factor was the outcome 
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17 This is not to suggest that western businesses did not operate in developing countries shortly 
after end of colonialism and independence in developing countries.  Rather, Blowfield (2005) 
point is that the private sector and the state viewed each other with suspicion, or viewed 
businesses as requiring state support and protection (i.e. import-substitution industrialization) 
(p.516). 
! 44!
of “Washington Concensus” that resulted in redefinition of the state from an agent for 
development toward a reduced role as a regulator (ibid; p.528) – to be discussed below.18  
CSR(and(the(Role(of(the(State:(A(Private%Sector(Approach((
CSR’s rise and claims about contributions to development should be seen in the 
context of economic globalization, neoliberal reforms, and restructuring of the state and 
regulations. Ite (2004) suggest that CSR agenda is possible only through globalization, 
deregulation and privatization (p.2).  By applying political economy approach, Kapelus 
(2002) explains that the liberalization of national economies in an increasing globalized 
world has had the effect of state deregulation and reduction of state responsibilities 
(p.292).  In exchange for deregulation, the private sector emphasized “voluntary forms of 
regulation, which further modified the role of the state” (Dansereau, 2010: 67).  The 
process of state withdrawal has resulted in entrenchment of CSR and voluntary approach 
in dealing with negative impacts of neoliberal reforms, both of which are critical elements 
in the post-Washington Consensus world (UNECA, 2011).  Negative impacts of market-
oriented reforms have provided little incentive for MNCs “… to engage in environmental 
best practice and contribute to local community development” (Hilson and Haselip, 2004: 
42).  In response to the mounting environmental and socio-economic impacts of mining 
operations by MNCs, the CSR model was put forward by World Bank as a way of 
reducing harm, and at the same time, avoiding the resource curse (Dansereau, 2010: 66).  
More importantly, Dansereau (2010) argue that CSR reflects changes to a changing 
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18 The Washington Concensus resulted in a series of policy reforms (liberalization, deregulation 
and privatization) aimed at reducing state’s role to facilitate and promote private-sector 
investment. Specificity on how these reforms transformed the global mining industry will be 
explained in the following section, paving way for discussions of whether CSR as a private 
sector-led development in mining contributes to growth and development.  
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governance framework for reduced state, deregulation, and expansion of economic 
activities by the private sector (ibid, p.66).   
Similarly, CSR experts like Idemudia (2008) and Dansereau (2010) argue that 
central to the CSR-development relationship is the shift from the state to private-sector 
for social improvement as a means to promote social welfare.  The expansion of corporate 
interests and responsibilities beyond its financial bottom line means that it now includes 
people and society.  Although it has traditionally been the responsibility of the 
government for ensuring mining contributes to economic and human development, MNCs 
are now responsible (Hamann, 2003).  Frynas (2005) suggests that the rise of CSR is 
traced back to globalization and societal expectations that as MNCs grows in size, power 
and influence, the same companies would fill in the gaps left behind by governments 
(p.583).   
CSR(and(Economic(Development(((
Proponents of mining argue that CSR’s economic development programs can 
establish linkages between mining operations and non-mining economic activities.  
CSR’s economic development programs in local communities are often called Alternative 
Livelihood Programs (ALPs), and consist of two main components: capacity building and 
economic activities (Larsen et al., 2009: 26).  CSR-based ALP initiatives can be either 
country and site-specific, and focus on agriculture to animal husbandry training, as well 
as training in activities such as production of palm oil, rubber, vegetables, poultry and 
other food crops (ibid, p.26).  While economic components of CSR emphasize training in 
agriculture and subsistence farming, capacity-building focus on training that contributes 
to human capital such as education and skills development in non-mining and non-
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agricultural industries.  Support for training programs in activities not related to mining 
improves self-sufficiency of communities adjacent to the mine (Yakovleva, 2005: 87).  
Examples provided by Larsen et al. (2009) include “entrepreneurial skills training (e.g., 
food-processing and other value-adding technologies), micro-credit management training, 
and training in participatory decision-making.” (p.26).  By diversifying the local 
economy, it is argued that CSR initiatives can lessen community dependence on the 
mining company, and ensure that mining operations do not operate in an “enclave” nature 
isolated from rest of the economy.   
 In Yankson’s (2010) examination of Gold Fields’, a South African mining 
company, ALP initiatives in Ghana’s Wassa West District, CSR funded programs were 
designed to integrate non-mining income generating activities into community 
development programs focused on growing the local economy, and improving the quality 
of life through education, training and capacity building (p.359).  By investing in income-
generating activities outside of mining, such as vegetable cultivation, livestock rearing, 
batik production, bakeries, soap and food processing, additional linkages can be made 
with other businesses and microfinance institutions for marketing and operating capital to 
access outside markets for its goods (ibid, p.365).  It is further suggested that by 
establishing these linkages for the long-term, the objectives of the ALP to increase 
income, provide economic opportunities and poverty reduction can be realized. 
 Additionally, UNECA (2011) highlights CSR’s contribution to job creation in 
parts of Africa where statutory frameworks for CSR requires mining companies to 
promote local employment (p.85).  The objectives of government legislation is not to 
legislate specific requirements for how CSR would contribute to community 
development, but to ensure social and labour plans, in the case of South Africa, contain 
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provisions for programs that address local economic development, human resources, and 
financial planning.   
Education(and(Health:(A(Community(Development(Approach(to(CSR((
Many development issues such as education and health are key pillars of CSR 
programs.  CSR supporters argue that mining provides benefits by improving quality of 
life through better education and health.  This rationale coincides with the view that 
mineral wealth contributes to development if natural capital is converted into human 
capital for future economic growth (Auty, 1998).  For the local communities adjacent to 
mining operations, the types of education and health programs implemented by MNCs are 
construction and/or rehabilitation of existing infrastructure (e.g. new classrooms, schools 
and clinics), scholarship opportunities from primary to university, skills training for 
students and adults, and free provision of health services to the general public, including 
expanded coverage for its employees and their families.  At the national level, Nelson and 
Prescott (2003) suggest that these types of social investments by companies assist poor 
countries in meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) goals, such as universal 
primary education (MDG Goal 2) by increasing school enrollment19, combat HIV/AIDs, 
malaria and other diseases (MDG Goal 6) through better access to drugs.20   
CSR strategies on education and health programs are increasingly community 
development focused.  For starters, the World Bank (1996) expanded the measure of a 
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19 According to Nelson and Prescott (2003), gold mining company Barrick, together with CARE 
International in Tanzania, increased number of school attending primary schools.  At the end of the six-year 
program, enrolment at the primary school increased by 75% and over 89% of students passed their final 
exams, an increase of 16% in 2001 (Nelson and Prescott, 2003: 14).   
20 Blowfield (2007) counters these claims by arguing that the impacts are unknown and unsubstantiated.  
Although a growing number of companies reference MDGs such as education, the outcome and impacts of 
private-sector contributions toward MDGs are unknown (Blowfield, 2007: 689).  For a more thorough 
discussion of CSR’s claims about impact on development, refer to Critical CSR Agenda section in Chapter 
1. 
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country’s wealth to include human and social capital (i.e. role of people and their 
education and health), as an addition to the traditional measure of natural capital.  The 
increasing focus on human capital is also evident in private sector, where Fox (2004) 
explains that corporate contributions to human capital have been increasingly 
development focused (i.e. companies to work for the poor), and less to do with finding 
business opportunities by doing development.  Kapelus (2002) and Ite (2004)’s studies 
highlight the changing CSR strategies where programs in South Africa and Nigeria are 
shifting from philanthropic donations to more socio-economic development.  Ite (2004) 
shows that Shell’s CSR efforts in Nigeria have become more effective by adopting a 
development approach that emphasizes the social capital of communities affected.  
However, with Nigeria experiencing effects of the resource curse, Ite (2004) argues that 
CSR’s contributions to development is limited unless governments, at the bare minimum, 
become involved in “partnership” with private sector as participants, conveners or 
facilitators (p.8).  Similarly, Kapelus (2002) discusses mining companies growing 
acceptance in South Africa to commit to socio-economic development in cooperation 
with the state through a public-private partnership (p.287).  Due to state cutbacks and new 
responsibilities as a result of structural adjustment period, public-private partnerships are 
increasingly viewed as solution in addressing the “capacity gaps” where private-sector 
can help assist meet development agenda traditionally assigned to the state, such as 
education and health (Nelson, 2006).    
The literature on company contributions in education and health reveal that first, 
partnerships between state and companies are necessary for social programs to be 
effective; and second, development is uneven between recipient communities of CSR and 
those that do not.  This has led many to question whether CSR is effective in improving 
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living standards.  In Dansereau’s (2010) discussion of Anglo American’s voluntary 
contributions to communities, the company increased its spending to R245 million in 
2009 on a number of initiatives, including job creation, skills development, education and 
health, business and infrastructure development (p.76).  The total cost was an increase 
from R52.2 million in 2006.  Education related activities included bursary program for 
614 students for mining related program, construction of new classrooms, school 
renovation, and a new community centre.  While the company was required to undertake 
social development projects with the municipal government, failures of the program was 
attributed to poor integration into a government development plan and lack of monitoring 
and evaluation with little attention to long-term sustainability (Limpitlaw, 2005 in 
Dansereau, 2010: 77).   
Again in South Africa, at the cost of R10 million (£1 million) Richard Bay 
Mine’s, a subsidiary of Rio Tinto, CSR projects in Mbonambi included “education (e.g., 
assisting local schools, promoting, technical education, teacher training, promoting life 
skills), health care (e.g., rural clinics, a 24 hour clinic for employees, an HIV/AIDS 
program) and community development (e.g. gardening and cooking clubs, support for 
small business, support for Rural Development Centre)” (Kapelus, 2002: 289).  While 
considered a generous budget designated for community development, its effectiveness is 
questioned by the regional development planning authority.  The planning body accused 
the mining company of not sharing development plans.  It also attributes the lack of 
coordination and integration by the company as a source of tension between the two 
sides.  The community of Mbonambi was viewed as an “island of development” in an 
underdeveloped region with a budget of £4.6 million for over 69 tribal districts (ibid, 
p.289-290).  Larsen et al. (2009) raises similar concerns of uneven development in Ghana 
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where without partnership of the state, CSR represents a shift toward “private social and 
spatial regulation” in mineral-rich regions that are of high commercial value to MNCs 
(p.265).   
Bury’s (2004) study of Newmont’s efforts to improve access to education and 
health across three communities in Peru also confirms uneven changes between 
communities and among households.  The study found that while local regions are 
extremely susceptible to large-scale mining, in the case of Newmont’s Yanacocha mine, 
access to human capital has generally increased.  Education programs provided by the 
company include formal education for children, adult training and education, school 
construction and renovations, provision of school furniture and supplies, transportation 
for teachers, and solar power facilities to reduce energy costs.  In terms of health 
programs, community members were provided various new preventative health services 
and resources.  
CSR’s(Good(Governance,(Transparency,(and(Accountability(
Large international mining companies are voluntarily involved in international 
voluntary reporting initiatives such as Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) 
as part of their CSR reporting.  EITI have proliferated in recent years aimed at improving 
transparency and accountability of state and corporate actors involved in resource 
extraction on issues relating financial payments to host countries.  EITI require MNCs 
and host governments to disclose information that were previously difficult to obtain.  By 
making this information open and transparent to the public, the desired outcome is that 
public awareness to enable citizens to demand greater accountability by those responsible.  
It is argued that CSR through implementation of EITI, political factors responsible for 
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economic and social under-performances of resource-rich countries can be ameliorated 
and mitigate the resource curse.   
The impetus for transparency and accountability of firms and governments can be 
traced to the World Bank’s “good governance agenda”.  Less than ten years after 
reforming the state’s role in the economy, the 1990s witnessed the World Bank promoting 
the “good governance” agenda with emphasis on political elements of neoliberal 
economic theory in which individual economic and political freedom must be protected 
(Leftwich, 1993: 608).  The “good governance” agenda first emerged after the 
developmental failures in the 1980s, in which the Bank blamed the state and lack of 
“good governance” as key factors for its inability to benefit from resource wealth.  By 
espousing principles of transparency, accountability, fairness, and democratic politics, the 
Bank argues that this strand of neoliberal developmental model contributes to a thriving 
market economy, and removes political bottlenecks to economic growth such as 
authoritarian rule or other forms of excessive state or political involvement (ibid, p.609).  
It is believed that these values would translate into broader objectives to improve 
governance in areas of rule of law, political accountability and exchange of information 
between the state and the citizenry (Woods, 2000 cited in Hilson and Maconachie, 2009: 
67).   
As Hilson and Maconachie (2009) explains, the World Bank, donors and Western 
governments have latched onto the political elements of the resource curse by blaming 
governments instead of foreign MNCs who control extraction projects (p.61).  It is 
pointed out that the Bank and its partners attribute the developmental problems of, for 
example Sub-Sahara Africa, as inability to capture mineral wealth to the lack of “good 
governance” and “democracy” – both deemed as essential conditions for development 
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(Leftwich, 1993: 605).  Specifically, “good governance” reflects increasing international 
pressure for both corporations and host governments to improve lack of transparency and 
accountability blamed for rent-seeking behaviour.  EITI represent the latest policy 
mechanisms aimed at mitigating rent-seeking.  This was originally launched by Tony 
Blair at the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, South 
Africa.  Although voluntary, implementation of EITI by signatory countries and 
companies required both parties to provide “full disclosure of taxes and other payments 
made by oil, gas and mining companies” (EITI, 2014d).  The logic behind transparency in 
royalty payments, as explained by Hilson and Maconachie (2009), centres on idea that 
“… impoverished institutions, the embezzlement of petroleum and / or mineral revenues, 
and a lack of transparency are the chief reasons why resource-rich sub-Saharan Africa is 
underperforming economically, and that implementation of the EITI, with its foundation 
of “good governance,” will help address these problems” (p.52). EITI proponents argue 
that when citizens are provided information about how much their government is 
receiving from natural resources, transparency would enable citizens to demand 
governments to be accountable for the mismanagement of revenue wealth resource 
extraction (ibid, p.57).   
For corporations, Waddock (2008) attributes voluntary CSR reporting as a 
response to absence of “global governance structure” that holds businesses accountable, 
responsible, transparent (p.87).  Private-sector’s emphasis on openness and transparency 
is largely a response to mounting pressure over MNC’s lack of responsibility over its 
negative social and environmental performances.  In particular, since 2002 MNCs in the 
mining sector began to demonstrate greater transparency and accountability to 
stakeholder as a result of the Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development (MMSD) 
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forum, where industry accepted greater social responsibility either assigned to them by 
law, society at large, shareholders, or other stakeholders (Yakovleva, 2005).  Presently, 
there is a proliferation of voluntary and legislated frameworks, norms and formats for 
how to report CSR, and are sector-dependent (UNECA, 2011: 82).  Waddock (2008) 
explains what has emerged is a voluntary institutional infrastructure that places pressure 
for MNCs “… for greater accountability, responsibility, transparency and sustainability” 
focused on environmental, social and governance (p.103).  The various types and 
examples of mining-specific CSR institutional infrastructure are:  
“codes (e.g., UN Global Compact); principles (e.g., Equator Principles); 
indexes (e.g., Dow Jones Sustainability Index); reporting mechanisms (e.g., 
Global Reporting Initiative); … CSR NGOs (e.g., Canadian Business for 
Social Responsibility); … industry association guidelines (e.g., International 
Council of Mining and Metals’ Sustainable Development Framework); 
project financing criteria (e.g. International Finance Corporation’s 
Performance Standards on Social and Environmental Sustainability); laws 
with national (e.g., tax laws) and extra-territorial reach (e.g., the proposed Bill 
C-300 regulating Canadian mining companies); electronic newsletters (e.g., 
CSRWire); academic journals (e.g., Journal of Corporate Citizenship and 
Journal of Business Ethics) and trade publications; activist NGOs (e.g., 
Corporate Watch).” (Sagebien and Whellams, 2010: 504).   
 
More recently, as more and more companies choose to participate in the EITI, 
CSR and sustainability reports have increasingly incorporated information about financial 
payments to host governments (e.g. see Barrick Gold, 2014).  At the time of writing, over 
eighty oil and gas and mining companies have voluntarily chosen to participate in the 
transparency initiative (EITI, 2014c).  Benefits for MNC’s participation, according to the 
EITI (2014b) include “enhanced relations with stakeholders and local communities, better 
risk management, improved company reputation and the opportunity to demonstrate 
industry leadership.”  From the perspective of Barrick Gold Corporation (EITI, 2014a), 
the world’s largest gold mining company and first Canadian company in the industry to 
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join EITI in 2006, a business case can be made about the benefits of full participation, 
such as improvements in business environment and reduced political risks.  The 
multinational firm is also committed to EITI’s principles of anti-corruption, transparency 
and accountability, and discloses taxes, royalties and other payments to governments 
within its annual Responsibility Report (EITI, 2014a).  Similarly, Newmont openly 
discloses its tax and royalty payments to governments, and its participation and support 
for the EITI is placed on the belief that its involvement will “improve governance in 
resource-rich countries … reduce the devastating effects that corruption can have on 
economic development and the rule of law” (Newmont, 2014a).   
CSR(as(Resource(Funds((
CSR’s emphasis on company-community relations requires mining companies to 
mitigate negative impacts of mining operations and provide benefits through community 
development projects.  Increasingly, voluntary contributions in the form of corporate 
foundations have been established as a mechanism to meet social responsibility 
commitments to fund development initiatives.  In this context, Yakovleva (2005) explains 
that foundations is a strategy for MNCs to respond to pressures on environmental and 
social concerns by funding development projects and building relations with the local 
communities.  Foundations are important because it involves transfer of accumulated 
mineral wealth captured by the private sector back to communities in the form social 
goods and services (Yakovleva, 2005: 204).  Unlike the NRF where the management of 
funds is governed by the state (Humphreys and Sandbu, 2007), the voluntary private-
sector funds are sourced from company profits and managed by MNCs.  However, 
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sometimes the funds may be managed in partnership with the state and civil society 
groups (Yakovleva, 2005: 203) 
 Yakovleva (2005) explains that corporate foundations are established during the 
opening of a new mine or in closure, and major factor depends on the size of the 
company.  Undoubtedly, the larger the company is in terms of profits and assets, the more 
likely corporate foundations will be established for community development projects.  
Targeted beneficiaries of development programs are community members in the 
surrounding areas of the mine, and very rarely outside of the mine’s catchment area.  
According to Yakovleva (2005), the expenditure of a majority of corporate foundations is 
about one million US dollars (p.224).  However, this number can vary dramatically 
depending on the type of mining company (i.e. gold, diamond, etc.).  Among gold mining 
companies, the budget ranged from 150 thousand US dollars to that of 13 million; as for 
the world’s largest diamond mining foundation, De Beers has a budget of 3.5 million US 
dollars a year (ibid, p.224).   
The types of programs funded depend on size of the company and the needs of the 
local communities.  Generally, the programs funded are education and training, 
community development, health, arts and culture, and business development; whereas for 
smaller mining foundations may only support initiatives related to the environment, 
economic development, research, job creation and agriculture.  Interestingly, out of the 44 
foundations reviewed by Yakovleva (2005), only ten supported environmental protection 
programs, despite the significant environmental damage posed by mining operations 
(p.225).   
As in the case with mining corporate foundations in Ghana, CSR funds are 
increasingly common in addition to the percentage of royalties redistributed back to the 
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communities through the Mineral Development Fund (MDF) administered by the 
Government of Ghana.  Projects supported by the foundations include capacity-building, 
economic activities, health-care and school and education (Larsen, et al., 2009: 264).  
Given the voluntary nature of these projects, funding formula for these programs vary 
from company to company.  Gold Fields Ghana, with a operating budget of US $1.6 
million in community development in 2005 in Ghana, is funded based on 0.5 percent of 
pre-tax profits on top of the US $1.00 per ounce of gold produced in Ghana, paid through 
its Gold Fields South Africa Foundation (ibid, p.263).  Similarly, Newmont’s corporate 
foundation in Ghana, Newmont Ahafo Development Foundation (NADeF), spends 1% of 
revenue on top of the US $1.00 per ounce of gold produced in the country.  
The(Critical(CSR(Agenda((
CSR is not without its criticisms.  Claims about the private-sector’s role through 
CSR and its contributions to social and economic development have been increasingly 
challenged from both within the business and development circles (Blowfield 2007, 
Sagebien and Whellam, 2010).  Together, they underscore the lack of effectiveness and 
willingness by private-sector to commit to their social responsibilities with society.  The 
basis for critical CSR agenda is premised on the need to know more about CSR’s impact, 
its limitations, and other alternative approaches before promulgating claims with 
definitive conclusions in CSR reporting (Blowfield and Frynas, 2005).  This section 
presents the critical-CSR perspective that critiques the benefits and contributions to 




CSR is Bad Capitalism 
 According to a famous American neoclassical economist, Milton Friedman, CSR 
is bad capitalism because businesses’ only social responsibility is more economic than 
social: that is, to make a profit for its shareholders.  In his own words, the “[f]ew trends 
could so thoroughly undermine the very foundations of our free society as the acceptance 
by corporate officials of a social responsibility other than to make as much money for 
their stockholders as possible” (cited in Hamann, 2003: 240-241).  By pursuing social and 
environmental objectives, CSR reduces financial growth and diminish shareholder value.  
Accordingly, Norberg (2003) advises that CSR is unnecessary if MNCs simply do not 
engage in bad behaviour, just like the physician’s guiding principle of “First do no harm”.  
In Norberg’s view, maximum profit is imperative because it is the only engine of growth 
that motivates companies to improve efficiency, grows the economy, reduces poverty and 
enriches the people 
 Thus, the “CSR is bad capitalism” view contends that business has no social 
responsibility beyond creating wealth and minimum compliance with law (Ite, 2005: 
914). Or as Friedman puts it: “The business of business is business” (quoted in Hamann, 
2003: 241).  CSR not only threatens corporate profits, but also interferes with the market 
and responsibilities of the state (Hamann, 2003: 241).  Generally speaking, this business-
like attitude is pervasive at the managerial level where staff is not trained or motivated to 
deal with non-business related problems, such as community development (ibid, p.241).  
On the flip side, Ite (2005) finds that if companies are successful in its CSR initiatives, 
then this erodes government’s responsibilities and obligations to look after its citizens, 
and prolongs community dependence on the company for additional assistance in the 
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foreseeable future (p.925).  For this reason, companies are reluctant to address 
governance issues and interfering with political process (Frynas, 2005: 596).   
 The question of whether CSR’s social objectives are compatible with economic 
objectives (i.e. profit and wealth creation) is at the heart of the “bad capitalism” school 
debate.  In line with the “business case” for CSR, responses to the bad capitalism school 
point out that Friedman’s view is out of date (Hamann, 2003: 241).  Assumptions behind 
Friedman’s neoclassical view ignore globalization and the Washington Concensus aimed 
at reducing the state.  As Jenkins (2005) points out, it was not until the 1990s that “cracks 
were appearing in the Washington Concensus and there was a growing awareness that the 
market alone was not sufficient to bring about development.” (p.529).  In a thirty year 
study carried out by Margolis and Walsh (2003), they found that majority of the 127 
empirical studies found positive correlation between socially responsible behaviour and 
their financial performance, leading the authors to recommend “embracing the tension 
between economic and broader social objectives as a starting point …” (p.268).  This 
positive correlation, at least in the mining industry, may be plausible given the close 
proximity of communities to large-scale mines.  For example, Humphreys (2000) 
suggests that relations with communities are crucial in managing project costs.  In order 
for mining company to meet its central objective – shareholder wealth – it must recognize 
the changing conditions in securing that objective, one of which is managing relations 
with the communities to avoid costs related to delays and disruptions to the project 
(p.131).21   
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21 Blowfield (2007) remains unconvinced that there is strong correlation between doing well 
financially well and good behaviour.  The author acknowledges Margolis & Wash’s study but 
suggest that in reality, CSR is primarily used to protect the brand.  If a link exists between the 
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Thesis Statement 
The thesis argues that CSR has limited impact in ensuring mining contributes to 
development due to the voluntary nature of private sector-led development.  CSR’s 
voluntary programs address short-term developmental problems without providing long-
term solutions to the problems.  The model put forward by mining companies and IFIs 
claims that voluntary programs will enhance mining’s contribution to development if 
CSR mitigates local impacts, enhance social and local economic development, and 
promote transparency through CSR reporting.  Together, it is intended to provide local 
and national developmental benefits.  More precisely, CSR claims to contributes to 
development by: creating economic linkages with local economic development programs 
(e.g. ALPs); fostering socio-economic development with education and health programs; 
establishing corporate resource funds to channel mineral funds back to communities; and 
supporting transparency initiatives on flow of resource revenues (e.g. EITI).   
The Ahafo Mine case study in Ghana shows that the voluntary nature of CSR falls 
short of replacing the state as an “agent of development”.  The thesis will demonstrate 
that although the political economy of Ghana promotes CSR and corporate self-
regulation, its impact on local communities are limited and unable to fill the void left by 
state deregulation.  Consequently, CSR’s voluntary approach is unsuccessfully in 
mitigating some of the factors responsible for the resource curse.  They are: diversify 
non-mining jobs opportunities through local economic development; improve social 
wellbeing and reduce poverty; and promote greater transparency and accountability in the 
use of resource revenues locally.  
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financial and non-financial performance, Blowfield argues it lies with CSR’s environmental 
management (p. 690).  
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Methodology 
This section outlines the methods used to support the second research objectives: 
evaluation of a CSR programs to assess its contributions to social and economic 
development.  The data needed to determine whether CSR has accomplished its objective 
of contributing to development is also provided.  Questions relating to the scope, impact 
and outcomes of CSR were asked in the affected communities to provide insights into 
overall effectiveness of the company’s social and economic development programs.  The 
questions asked focused on community’s perceptions of economic and social 
development programs, their understanding of CSR in addressing impacts of the mine, 
and the experiences and outcomes of the programs.  List of interview questions are 
provided in Appendices A and B.    
The case study selected is Newmont’s open-pit gold mine in Ghana. First, 
Newmont’s Ahafo Mine CSR programs will be identified and described.  A description 
and identification of the company’s voluntary initiatives is needed to ascertain a fulsome 
picture of CSR programs, its aims and objectives, and how these programs contribute to 
development.  The task of providing information and data on Newmont’s CSR activities 
is available in greater detail in Project Setting (Chapter Two).   
The task of assessing Newmont’s CSR contributions to development was carried 
out in the summer of 2013 in Ghana.  Over a four-week period in July, primary and 
secondary data was collected using a variety of qualitative research methods to test my 
hypothesis, including interviews, observations and document analysis.  Given the 
complexity of the relationship between mining, CSR and development, and the entangled 
causal mechanisms of the resource curse, qualitative research’s emphasis on holistic 
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understanding of complex issues and process helps researchers to capture different 
perceptions, underlying meaning, and unexpected sensitive issues (Mayoux, 2006: 118).  
Qualitative techniques, according to Berg (2004), provide insights into others that help 
researchers understand and explore how people relate to systemic structures and ways it 
give meaning to people’s daily lives.  In other words, qualitative research can be useful in 
providing meaning and context in ways that quantitative research cannot as it relies on 
data.  Although the field study relies heavily on qualitative techniques to understand 
communities’ experiences and perceptions on Newmont’s CSR programs, other 
quantitative data were also collected and will be utilized in this report.  Data was gathered 
from a variety of primary and secondary sources, in conjunction with semi-structured 
interviews with government policy-makers, NGOs, and residents of communities located 
within the catchment area of Newmont’s CSR programs.  
In total, thirteen interviews were conducted with individuals from government 
policy-makers and NGOs over the four-week fieldwork.  Interviews were conducted in 
order to elicit responses from individuals who work directly and indirectly on issues 
pertaining to Newmont’s CSR programs, or issues on related to Ghana’s mining industry.  
Appendix A outlines the list of questions and issues explored during the interview, 
including description of CSR and its effectiveness from their perspective.  The interviews 
were semi-structured with open-ended questions to allow participants the opportunity to 
answer the questions, but also to provide additional information they feel are relevant.  
Within this semi-structured approach, a number of open-ended questions were asked of 
each participant. 
Government officials and the NGO staff interviewed are affiliated with the 
following government ministries, and organizations in civil society or private sector:   
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• Large Taxpayer Office, Ghana Revenue Authority; 
• Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning; 
• Minerals Commission; 
• Brong-Ahafo District Assembly Engineering Department;  
• Ghana Education Service; 
• Global Alliance for Development Foundation;  
• Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); 
• Newmont Ahafo Development Foundation (NADeF); 
• Opportunities Industrialization Centre International (OICI); and  
• Ghana Health Service  
Secondary information obtained in the field consists of reports and publications 
from key stakeholder groups such as Newmont, government ministries and development 
foundation.  This information is critical in triangulating the data gathered from other 
sources such as media reports and interviews, and also to augment literature review.  The 
documents contained from various government departments are:  
• CSR Guidelines – Minerals Commission; 
• 2011 / 2012 Annual Education Review Report – Ghana Education Service; 
• Newmont Ahafo Mine Mining Permit – Environmental Protection Agency; 
• Mining royalties and revenue for Government of Ghana – Large Taxpayer Office 
(Ghana Revenue Office); and  
• Budget expenditures on community development projects since 2008 – NADeF.   
Focus group interviews with residents of four communities located near the mine 
were conducted to elicit responses on individual’s experiences with Newmont’s CSR 
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programs.  In total, eighty residents were interviewed with twenty residents sampled from 
each of the following communities: Kenyasi I, Kenyasi II, Ntotroso, and Gyedu.  
Members of the community interviewed were selected based on the criteria that the 
sample size should encompass as many people from different occupations as possible.  
For example, farmers, business owners in formal and informal sectors (i.e. store owners, 
shoe repairmen, hair salon, bread making), teachers, nurses and taxi drivers were 
interviewed.  In Kenyasi II and Ntotroso where farmers were displaced and resettled, ten 
affected farmers in each of these communities were interviewed.  The rationale was based 
on the assumption that the mining project had the greatest impact on this group, and had 
the most to gain from the company’s CSR programs.   
In addition to interviews with government departments and NGOs, community 
focus group interviews are important in that it provides another perspective on CSR.  
More importantly, as communities are often front-line stakeholders who bear the brunt of 
large-scale development projects, community interviews are paramount in determining 
scope and impact of CSR.   
The focus group interview is a useful method in drawing out a range of views and 
opinions within communities.  During the four-week period, participants in the focus 
groups ranged from two to ten; however, on average most group sessions averaged about 
four participants.  Efforts were made to avoid small groups of two, or large groups of ten 
for timing considerations. In addition, large groups more than six were also discouraged 
due to difficulties in capturing all the opinions and experiences expressed by the 
participants.  Community interviews were made possible with the help and support of 
Livelihood and Environment Ghana (LEG), a local NGO working on mining-related 
issues and representing community interests.  Through LEG’s work in the communities 
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and network of volunteers, the NGO was instrumental in the success of group interviews 
by providing guidance and insights on the communities.    
Lastly, several interview requests were made to Newmont prior to and after 
arriving in Ghana for field research.  Upon arrival, the company advised that NADeF 
would be better suited for interviews, although the foundation was established as an 
independent body from the company.  Therefore, this thesis report does not reflect 
opinions and views that the mining company may have about CSR, impacts on the 
communities, and more broadly, national-level issues related to mining and development.   
!  
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Chapter 2: The Role of Mining and Development in Ghana  
Introduction  
Presently, Ghana’s role and position in the international economy is largely 
shaped by global demand for gold (Bloch and Owusu, 2012: 436).  As Africa’s second 
largest producer of gold behind South Africa, the country’s mining industry has benefited 
from soaring production volumes over two million ounces in the past decade, and gold 
revenue $600 million higher than in 2008 at $2.8 billion (Bloch and Owusu, 2012: 434).22  
By opening-up new areas for exploration, Ghana has attracted more than $5 billion of 
direct investment into the mineral exploration that have resulted in the establishment and 
expansion of new mines in the country (Yankson, 2010: 355).  With gold output risen 65 
percent over the last five years to a total of 190 tonnes or around 8 percent of the global 
total, Ghana has been the major contributor to a rapidly growing mining industry in West 
Africa (Bloch and Owusu, 2012: 436).  
Ghana’s productive mining sector is the result of the structural adjustment 
programs (SAPs) implemented in the name of neoliberal reforms in the 1980s.  SAPs 
were reforms applied to mining and other economic sectors to be make the structural 
changes necessary to be competitive internationally in order to contribute to national 
development. And since the reforms, the same organization that prescribed the adjustment 
programs now ranks Ghana as a lower-middle income country (World Bank, 2014), 
despite achieving the enviable status of being Africa’s second largest gold producer 
accounting for 38 per cent of total export earnings in 2011 (Bermudez-Lugo, 2013: 20.1).  
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22!After a period of low gold price at the turn of the century, the industry resumed its upward trajectory 
with gold rising from around $300/oz. in early 2002 to over $1,400/oz. in the last quarter of 2010, and 
continued with record highs of over $1,900/oz. reached in September (Bloch and Owusu, 2012: 434).  !
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Using the IMF’s own criteria of more than twenty-five percent of total export, some 
analysts consider Ghana a mineral dependent state at risk of the resource curse with 
implications on national development and local communities (Haglund, 2011: 4; Standing 
and Hilson, 2013).  This chapter discusses the political economy of Ghana’s mining 
industry with a focus on the changing role of the mining sector and the role of the state in 
Ghana’s development strategy since the country’s independence.   
Post-Independence and State-led Development Years  
After gaining independence at the end of the Second World War, developing 
countries played an active role in the development of national economies and legitimized 
its authority by extending social services and citizenship rights (Clark, 2003: 4).  In 
Ghana, the post-independence state took power in 1957 from Britain and abandoned the 
country’s colonial name: the Gold Coast.  Upon independence, the first priority of the 
government was nationalization of key industrial sectors such as mining.  Several state 
enterprises were established in various sectors to oversee the management of operations.  
In 1961, the nationalization of mineral resources created the State Gold Mining 
Corporation (SGMC).   
The goal of nationalization is to generate income and create jobs and employment 
opportunities for the people of Ghana (Tsuma, 2010: 14).  To do so, state ownership of 
resources was equally as important as the creation of state enterprises. By retaining 
mining legislation from the colonial era, which gave the governor authority over the 
lands, it was interpreted that the president of the post-independence state assumes total 
dominion and power over the resources (ibid, p.14).  Tsuma (2010) notes that the creation 
of the SGMC and inheritance of colonial mining legislation confirms that the 
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interventionist approach by the state, or state-led development, would play a central role 
during this period.  The responsibility of the government is to engage in revenue 
generating activities such as mineral extraction for the purpose of national development.   
This interventionist approach embodied the structuralist theory and state-led 
development framework, which as Arthur (2006b) explains, were models of economic 
development for two decades (p.35).  Due to the disappointing returns from foreign-
owned activities in several key industrial sectors during colonial period, what had 
emerged was the view that only the government could build local linkages by asserting 
national sovereignty over resources (UNCTAD 2005 in Larsen et al., 2009: 247).  
Structuralists were also of the position that states and governments had the ability to 
intervene and correct any imperfections in the market system (Arthur, 2006: 34).  So, to 
protect the society from failures of the market system, which can generate inequalities, 
dislocations and exploitation, structuralists advocated governments to establish measures 
to protect nascent industries from foreign competition (ibid, p.34).  With the state in 
control of the economy, the development strategy of state-dominated ISI was widely 
adopted by developing countries in Asia, Middle East and Africa, following in the 
footsteps of the Soviet Union (World Bank, 1997: 23).   
 Under state-led development model, the economy was excessively controlled due 
to a number of factors.  First, for reasons already explained, the expanded state control 
would better protect the economy and society from lack of stability in the market.  
Second, African countries recognized the urgency in investing heavily in education and 
industry development due to the lack of skills and infrastructure needed to develop its 
national economies (Hilson, 2004: 54).  During this time, governments in developing 
countries grew twice their size by taking on new roles such as support for education and 
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health care through transfers and subsidies (World Bank, 1997: 22).  In Ghana, then 
president Kwame Nkrumah was committed to the model of an interventionist state, or 
state control of the economy, and remained committed to a government budget to cover 
services and programs, rather than to reduce spending (Hilson, 2004: 59).    
This period of state control and ownership over its natural resources also deterred 
foreign investments.  As Morgan (2002: 165) explains, mineral policy and legal 
frameworks that promote state ownership and nationalization serve as barriers to foreign 
investments (cited in Haselip and Hilson, 2005: 89).  Before Ghana implemented 
structural adjustment reforms in the 1980s, the state had near-complete control of the 
mining industry through purchase of all equity shares of mines on the brink of collapse 
(Hilson, 2004: 61).  Furthermore, GSMC acquired shares in Ashanti Goldfields who was 
the largest gold producer in the country at the time, and nationalized all the mines in the 
country (ibid, p.61).  At the time of independence, Ghana’s GDP per capita was over 
US$450, approximately forty percent higher than in Botswana (ICMM, 2007: 10).  In the 
subsequent fifteen years, however, Ghana’s GDP experienced general decline while 
Botswana experienced significant growth of about 7.9 percent (ibid p.10).  By 1983, 
national GDP was 29.6 percent of the 1970 figure with two-thirds of the population living 
in absolute poverty (Hilson, 2004: 58).  At the same time, mining production under the 
state-led period operated at a loss as state-run mines lacked investment, maintenance and 
modernization (Tsuma, 2010: 16).   
Economic Recovery Program and the Minimalist State Years  
Ghana’s state-led development model came to an abrupt halt in the early 1980s.  
Under government control since the early 1960s, the economy had been on the decline 
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with deep reduction in the production of cocoa and cotton production (Hilson, 2004: 58).  
Mining was no exception.  Hutchful (2002) explains that Ghana’s mining sector 
experienced a steep, across-the-board declines in production as a result of a number of 
factors: declining grade of ore, lack of exploration, shortage of spare parts, and lack of 
investments into improvements and upkeep of aging equipment (p.83).  By 1982, the 
sector was considered in crisis when the mining only produced two-thirds of its 
production levels shortly after independence (Hilson and Yakovleva, 2007: 101).  In the 
view of the World Bank, the economic calamity and deteriorating conditions were the 
result of the excessive control of the state in the economy.  The cost of state-led 
development strategy, first warned by Ghana’s national bank to Nkrumah in early 1960s, 
became ever more apparent during 1980s debt crisis.   
Desperate to reverse 3-year GDP growth rate of -14.9 percent, the then President 
of Ghana, Jerry Rawlings, with his Finance Minister launched the first national SAP 
(Hilson, 2004: 59).23  Designed by the IMF and World Bank, the IFIs imposed SAPs onto 
debt-stricken countries as precondition for financial loans and debt relief, in exchange for 
reforms that promote FDIs. The arguments presented by the IFIs assert that these 
structural adjustment reforms will invariably reduce poverty and reduce inequalities 
between the rich and poor, and between rural areas and urban centres (ibid, p.55).  Key 
elements of SAPs are elimination of price controls, privatization of state-owned 
industries, removal of subsidies, free trade and other orthodox liberal economic measures 
(Jeong, 1995: 82). In 1983, SAPs in Ghana became the basis of the country’s national 
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23 Since Ghana initiated its own SAP in 1983, thirty-five countries in sub-Sahara Africa 
implemented one-hundred and sixty-two SAPs with the WB and IMF between 1980s and 1990s, 
with an additional one-hundred and twenty-six SAPs introduced throughout the rest of the world 
(Campbell, 2003b: 4).  !
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Economic Recovery Program (ERP), an attempt to revive the collapse of Ghana’s major 
export sectors that have received little investment since independence.  As Konadu-
Agyemang (2002) explains, SAPs entail a process to reform economic policies and 
institutions to promote and enhance economic growth, efficient allocation of resources, 
and further increase economies resiliency to the ever-changing global markets (cited in 
Hilson 2004: 54).  In other words, economic growth would be achieved through 
devaluation, trade liberalization and privatization.  Loans from the World Bank and IMF 
were conditional on the basis that measures would be implemented to reduce government 
spendings and involvement in economic activities, while facilitating a market-based 
allocation of resources and provide an ‘enabling environment’ for private enterprises (ibid 
p.56).  The adjustment experience, as Bierstekers (1990) points out, were a “far cry from 
the experiences the extensive state intervention, economic nationalism, and state socialist 
experimentation found in much of the developing world during the 1960s and 1970s” 
(p.477).   
 Mining, among other industrial sectors, was key target for reform by the IFIs.  
Prior to SAPs, the government controlled and engaged in all of Ghana’s economic sectors 
by controlling numerous enterprises such as manufacturing, industrial (e.g. mining) and 
service sectors.  To address the underperformance of state-owned enterprises where the 
state had direct majority holding in 181 of 235 companies, SAP’s aim of privatization 
devolved state ownership and shares over to the private sector (Hilson, 2004: 59).   
The ERP also resulted in creation of several new mining specific legislations, 
which contributed to mining boom in the country.  For example, the new mining code 
new legal framework also addresses fiscal policies such as corporate income tax, capital 
allowance, royalty rates, and other duties (Campbell, 2003b: 4).  The first ever Ghanaian 
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mining legislation was the Minerals and Mining Law in 1986, which not only established 
the Minerals Commission (MC) to regulate the sector, but further opened the mining 
sector by introducing significant new benefits to investors in the country (Ayee et al, 
2011: 9).  It set out a number of tax incentives to foreign investors, provided flexibility in 
royalty and corporate income payment schedules, and lastly, empowered the minister 
responsible for mining, at his own discretion, “to grant any requests from distressed 
companies for deferment of royalty payments” (Akabzaa 2009: 33). This new measure, 
combined with the rise in gold price, sparked substantial new interest in Ghana from 
mining companies with more than fifty-five gold prospecting licenses issued between 
1986 and 1989, and three gold mining companies in production in the late 1990s (Ayee et 
al, 2011: 9).  It is estimated that during 1983-1993 alone, more than US $900 million was 
invested in the Ghanaian mining sector.  At the same time, the state was restricted to ten 
percent mandatory equity participation in all mining investment, with the option of 
increasing its participation to twenty percent, but paid for at a commercial price (Akabzaa 
2009: 33).  
Despite economic achievements, after ten years pressure was mounting to replace 
it with a more competitive legislation.  Concerns were brewing about newly reformed 
mining sectors of other African states (e.g. Guinea, Mali, Tanzania, Madagascar), who 
had, ironically, modeled their mining codes after Ghana.  Without changes to the existing 
law, suspicions mounted about the uneven competitiveness and loss of foreign investment 
to countries like Tanzania, Guinea and Mali.  The lack of expansion in issuance of 
exploration permits and stagnant investment environment that dominated industry 
between 1998 and 2000 also led the Ghanaian government to replace it with a new, and 
more competitive, Mining Act, in 2006 (Akabzaa, 2009:34).  While the new legislation 
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retained similar provisions from the previous law on taxes such as corporate income 
taxes, dividend withholding taxes, capital gain taxes and royalties, taxation rates were 
marked down significantly.  For example, in the case with corporate income tax, it has 
been successively reduced from 50-55% in 1975 to 45% in 1986, and reduced even more 
down to 35% in 1994 (Campbell, 2003b: 4).   
The liberalization of Ghana’s mining sector and passing of sector specific 
legislation did accomplish IFIs’ stated goals of promoting economic growth.  In many 
ways as the first country in Sub-Sahara Africa to implement reforms, Ghana’s experience 
was an experiment, which were later modeled after by other African countries with 
similar regulatory and institutional frameworks.  According to Akabzaa (2009), the 
impetus for restructuring of the mining industry is the paradigm shift to a thesis that the 
state should be constrained to the promotion and regulation of private investment, and not 
be directly involved in the management of mining projects (p.31).  This view is supported 
in two documents pointed out by Campbell (2003b): first, the 1992 study Strategy for 
African Mining, and second, the 1998 Assistance for Mineral Sector Development and 
Reform in Member Countries.  Here, it was identified that the 1992 World Bank study 
specifies the need for “A clearly articulated mining sector policy that emphasizes the role 
of the private sector as owner and operator and of the government as regulator and 
promoter” (p.53). Furthermore, other key government functions such as to supervise, to 
plan, to mediate, and to enforce with the objective of bringing binding results were not 
mentioned in the documents (Campbell, 2003b: 6).  Reforms were premised on removal 
of the state, or state withdrawal, from direct participation in mining activities; 
furthermore, the state’s interests would be better served by limiting itself to promote and 
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regulate the industry so that the private sector and investors can do the mining (World 
Bank, 1992).  
Privatization of mining and other industrial sectors have had profound impact on 
Ghana’s national economic and social development. Campbell (2003b) argues that fervor 
to reform and liberalize the mining sector, in essence, traded away the state’s capacity and 
responsibility in the mining sector to promote social and economic developmental for 
foreign investment that are not conducive for poverty reduction and development.  More 
fundamentally, Campbell (2003b) concludes that the effect has been to “redefine the 
relations between the states and markets, and states and their societies, involving a 
redirection, redefining and even withdrawal of the functions of the state as they had 
previously existed” (p.3). Similarly, Dansereau (2005) points to this process as removing 
the state as the principle agent of development, and therefore allowing private agencies to 
serve an increasing public role by engaging in public service delivery (p.47).  Central to 
the SAPs was the explicit reforms to the legal and regulatory frameworks in mining, 
which minimized state’s involvement in the industry as a promoter for foreign capital.  
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers and Mining Years 
What has emerged since the end of the 1990s is a new policy framework from the 
IFIs in providing national targets for reducing poverty.  The Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Initiative, launched by the World Bank and the IMF in response to criticisms of their 
SAPs, was introduced as a new lending process for development projects that satisfy a set 
of criteria that are country-driven, results focused and partnerships-oriented (Whitfield, 
2005: 641).  This new initiative requires low-income countries like Ghana, or other 
members of HIPC, to complete Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) for undisrupted 
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access to IFI concessional lending and to debt relieve (ibid p.642).  Efforts to improve the 
developmental progress of low-income countries were also reinforced by the MDGs 
based on agreed eight economic and social targets at the United Nations in 2000.  As 
Easterly (2009) explains, “The MDGs were meant as a major motivational device to 
increase development efforts in and on behalf of poor countries, and the resulting 
publicity and aid increases suggest they can claim considerable achievement on that score 
. . . [however] Africa . . . is the only continent not on track to meet any of the goals of the 
Millennium Declaration by 2015.” (p.26).  This newly espoused lending policy by the 
World Bank means that it is a continuation of lending practices from the structural 
adjustment period.  Whitfield (2005) explains that while the ‘first generation reforms’ in 
the 1990s was concerned with reducing the role of the state, the ‘second generation 
reforms’ under PRSP involves a range of IFI and donor interventions and their agendas 
extended into all areas of policy, and increasing their physical presence (p.643). 
As discussed previously, the export-led model based on mining’s potential to 
stimulate economic growth and poverty alleviation is heavily favoured by the World 
Bank.  Campbell (2006), however, challenges the assertion that export-based economic 
growth has succeeded in reversing high rates of poverty, and that there is no correlation 
between macro-economic policies of SAPs and poverty alleviation (p.4). In Campbell’s 
(2006) study of Ghana and four other African case studies, the reforms to the mining 
codes designed to attract foreign investment in mining were void of developmental 
objectives and targets.  Not only have regulatory reforms provided fiscal and other 
incentives to attract mining investments, there has been significant reduction in 
government’s capacity and involvement in regulatory and ownership roles.  And through 
the negotiation of specific agreements between the government and companies, the latter 
! 75!
have benefited from additional fiscal exemptions from the mining codes, which IFI 
authorities had attempted to abolish as a condition linked to the implementation of the 
country’s PRSP (Campbell, 2006: 9).   
Although the approach of the PRSPs was for the IFIs to reposition their unpopular 
lending practices of structural adjustment reforms, Whitfield (2005) cautions that the 
second generation reforms do not substantially change their lending practices nor their 
policy agenda (p.658-659).  Furthermore, rather than to address the issues of “withdrawal 
of the state” raised by Campbell (2003b), and Dansereau’s (2007) emphasis on private 
sector role as agents of development, the lending and policy requirements of the PRSPs 
further supplant companies as private actors that will meet the developmental challenges 
created from structural adjustment.  As argued by Campbell (2006), when government 
authorities are increasingly unable to monitor, enforce and regulate due to budgetary 
reductions and lack of human and financial resources, this gap in responsibility become 
that of the private sector through international voluntary codes (p.14).  To summarize, the 
effect of IFI’s vision on mining as driver for growth to combat poverty, the emphasis on 
regulatory reform, and reduction of government role to promote investment can be 
problematic if it does not provide the “safeguards and conditions necessary to permit 
reaching development objectives” (Campbell, 2006: 15).   
Decentralization of Ghana’s Mineral Wealth 
While Ghana has experienced unprecedented levels of economic growth thirty-
one years after the ERP, many scholars such as Akabzaa (2009) and Standing and Hilson 
(2013) question the management and redistribution of resource revenues to local 
communities for community development projects, despite the country’s sound policies 
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of decentralizing mineral wealth back to local authorities.  For example, in 2011 Ghana 
was ranked third fastest growing economies in the world at 15 percent (World Bank, 
2013a).  In that year, government revenue from mining royalties increased significantly to 
US$131.3 million due to record-level gold prices, which accounted for about fourteen 
percent of the country’s total internal revenue (Standing and Hilson, 2013: 4).  Resources 
revenues are then redistributed to local communities in two ways: first, twenty percent of 
royalties paid to government are redistributed to the Mineral Development Fund (MDF) 
and local administrative authorities to fund social and economic development projects in 
rural communities; and second, companies initiate voluntary development programs as 
part of their CSR programs.  Numbers provided by Larsen et al. (2009) indicate that total 
revenue generated by gold mining companies operating in Ghana in 2005 totaled 
US$903,899, 619, resulting in US$ 27,116,989 collected in royalties, of which twenty 
percent (US$ 5,423,398) is allocated to the MDF (p.264).  
The second mechanism in which mineral wealth is channeled back to local 
communities is through private-sector voluntary initiatives such as CSR.  In recent times, 
the number of voluntary CSR development projects by MNCs has also increased 
substantially in Ghana.  These development projects are financed by the companies based 
on a fixed percentage of pre-tax profits plus a fixed amount of money for every ounce of 
gold mined at the particular location.  For example, Gold Field’s projects are funded 
through its Gold Fields South Africa Foundation on the basis of 0.5 per cent of pre-tax 
profits in addition to US$1.00 for every ounce of gold produced in Ghana.  In 2005, the 
company invested US$1.6 million in projects.  Similarly, Newmont allocates one percent 
of net profits from the Ahafo mine to Newmont Ahafo Development Foundation 
(NADeF), which supports key development projects in the areas of human resource 
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development, economic empowerment, infrastructure development, natural resource 
protection programs, and other social amenities.   
While the resurgence of the mining sector has made significant contributions to 
growth of the economy, with increased production by 290% since 2000 (Standing and 
Hilson, 2013: 2), the industry’s ability to contribute to national and local development has 
been less than stellar.  According to the latest 2013 Human Development Report, Ghana 
still rank in the lower end of the Medium Human Development category at 135th out of 
186th (UNDP, 2013). Mining skeptics argue that formal and informal channels for 
redistributing mineral wealth back to local communities have provided little benefits, and 
only exacerbated inequalities and marginalized the poor in rural communities.  
Improvements in living conditions and well-being of Ghanaians have not improved; 
instead, the reforms have only accomplished the objective of attracting FDIs to increase 
the number of exploration licenses and startup of new mines. Although over 25 percent of 
the country’s export comes from the mineral sector, the percentage of the population 
living below the poverty line with less than $2 per day is about 28 percent (Standing and 
Hilson, 2013).   
The lack of “trickle-down” effects from the sector has been well documented.  
Akabzaa (2009) notes the ongoing conflicts between mining companies and communities 
over community resettlement and relocation to pave way for new startup mines, and 
increasing incidents of inadequate compensation for loss of property such as land and 
housing (p.35). Wan (2014) attributes the litany of mining’s environmental and social 
impacts as issues of social injustice, which are directly correlated to Ghana’s political 
economy that favours mineral extraction over traditional economic activities of rural 
communities (p.9).  As Hamann (2003) suggests, it is through examples such as these that 
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the mining industry is notoriously known for its poor track record of irresponsible 
treatment to communities and the environment that mining’s contributions to sustainable 
development have been increasingly questioned and challenged.  And in response to such 
criticisms, the industry has resorted to CSR, a voluntary self-regulatory strategy, to 
minimize environmental and social impacts of its operations.  
Chapter Conclusion  
This chapter highlighted the changing role of the state as a result of Ghana’s 
structural adjustment reforms.  The reforms, known as the ERP, opened the doors to 
privatization aimed at attracting FDIs to revitalize a struggling mining sector for national 
development.  Under the market-based reforms, state-owned enterprises were eliminated 
to make way for investors and private enterprises, signaling the end to state-led 
development.  Since the decision to adopt a market-based neoliberal to economic 
development, the debate on national benefits of Ghana’s integration into the global 
economy and mining’s contribution to national development have proliferated.  In the 
midst of this debate is the emergence of CSR to compensate for lack of development and 
poor standards of living.   
This polarizing debate has two camps.  One school of thought argues that the 
mining industry has contributed substantially to the national development and poverty 
alleviation in Ghana.  The strongest and loudest advocate within this camp is ICMM 
representing MNCs and Ghana’s Chamber of Mines. Proponents in this camp argue that 
mining companies have been actively engaged with community stakeholders and 
providing developmental benefits through CSR.  
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On the other hand, scholars and NGOs argue that despite the transformation of the 
mining industry since the 1980s, the sector has not improved standards and wellbeing of 
communities, and development has been uncoordinated, isolated and often sporadic.  It is 
further argued that neoliberal economic reforms have increased communities’ 
vulnerability.  Mining critics argue that the lack of community benefits is result of 
reduced taxes and royalties from the mineral codes.  Consequently, MNCs have benefited 
from the fiscal incentives  of mining legislation in exchange for reduced percentage of 
taxes and royalties available from mining operations.  In conclusion, this chapter has 
establishes the importance of the mining sector to Ghana as the country become 
increasingly dependent on the sector for economic growth and national development.  
Given the developmental challenges and the reduced role of the state, Chapter 3 describes 
how the private sector, in this case Newmont Mining Corporation, have responded with 
CSR initiatives aimed at promoting development in lieu of the state.  
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Chapter 3: Ahafo Mine and CSR in Ghana  
Introduction  
This chapter examines whether Newmont Mining Corporation’s CSR programs 
for its Ahafo Mine in Ghana have had a positive impact on the communities and avoided 
the social, economic and political consequences often associated with the resource curse. 
Based on field research undertaken in Ghana in 2013, CSR were implemented to improve 
the economic and social conditions of local communities, and at the same time address 
political dimensions of the resource curse through the EITI to mitigate rent-seeking 
activities.   
The political economy of the mineral industry since ERP outlined in Chapter 2 
reveal the disparities between Ghana’s impressive economic recovery, increasing 
dependence on mineral sector, and lack of developmental progress in the HDI rankings.  
Scholars such as Ackah and Baah-Boateng (2012) questions the quality and benefits of 
economic growth when the country’s workforce are engaged in the informal sector and 
vulnerable employment opportunities while a quarter of households living in poverty 
(p.33).  Critics of the mining sector lament over the benefits of a reformed mining sector 
as being disproportionally appropriated by mining companies, consultancies and 
traditional rulers at the expense of local communities (Akabzaa, 2009).  Others such as 
Larsen et al. (2009) notes that MNCs with operating mines in the country are providing 
significant voluntary contributions through established development foundations.  
Newmont, like many other MNCs, has been financing their CSR programs through 
initiatives such as ALPs and community development funds to alleviate poverty (Hilson 
and Banchirigah, 2009; Larsen et al., 2009; Yankson, 2010).  Newmont’s CSR programs 
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have been applauded and received recognition both in Ghana and internationally. Ghana’s 
Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) own AKOBEN ratings has ranked Newmont’s 
CSR programs as gold with “Excellent” performance and “Committed to social 
performance” (EPA Ghana, 2012).  Chapter 3 introduces Newmont’s CSR’s programs in 
Ghana and how it has, or has not, addressed the shortcomings of the resource curse.   
Background: Ahafo Mine in Ghana  
Newmont Ghana Gold Limited (NGGL), a subsidiary company of U.S.-based 
Newmont Mining Corporation, operates the Ahafo Mine in Ghana.  The latter is one of 
the world’s largest multinational gold mining company with operations across the globe: 
United States, Australia, Peru, Indonesia, Ghana, New Zealand, Mexico and Canada.24  
The Ahafo gold mine began production in 2006, and is the company’s first ever project in 
Africa.  In 2012, the mine produced 561,000 ounces of gold, and reported gold reserves 
of 11.6 million ounces.  
The mine is located in the Brong-Ahafo Region of western Ghana, approximately 
290 kilometres northwest of the national capital, Accra.  The ore deposit is found beneath 
a community of about 1,700 households from two traditional areas, Ntotroso and Kenyase 
II. The total concession area is about 40 kilometres long divided into Ahafo North in 
Tano North District and Ahafo South in the Asutifi District, in total affecting 10,000 
people including more than 50 villages and hamlets across ten communities (Zandvliet, 
2005: 8).  The ten communities are Adrobaa, Afrisipakrom, Gyedu, Kenyasi1, Kenyasi II, 
Ntotroso, Susuanso, Terchire, Wamahinso and Yamfo.  The project employs 
approximately 4,000 people (GHEITI, 2014). At the time of writing, the mine is operating 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24!For the purpose of this research, the remainder of the thesis will refer to owner and operator of 
the Ahafo Mine as Newmont, not NGGL since it is a subsidiary company.  !
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four open pits in the Ahafo South portion of the deposit, affecting Kenyasi I & II, 
Ntotroso and Gyedu – these communities make up the focus of the thesis research where 
twenty community members in each four communities were interviewed.   
Economically, Newmont’s Ahafo Mine is a major contributor to Ghana’s 
economy.  While the mining sector make up 6.3 percent of Ghana’s GDP, in 2009 the 
Ahafo Mine produced $528 million of gold export, which represented 9 percent of 
Ghana’s total export and accounted for 20.7% of Ghana’s gold exports (Kapstein, 2011: 
27).  Since production began in 2006, Newmont has contributed USD $687 million in 
government taxes (Newmont, 2014b).  In 2013, total taxes and royalties paid was USD 
$136,873,687.  
The population of both Tano and Asutifi Districts are estimated to be 207,889 
(WBCSD, 2009).  This region is a tropical breadbasket known for growing cocoa, and the 
agricultural sector account for approximately seventy percent of the two districts’ 
economic activities (ibid, 2009).  Although the Ahafo Mine employs 32 percent of its 
workers and contractors locally, incidence of poverty in the two districts is reported to be 
higher than Brong-Ahafo’s average of 36 percent (ibid, 2009).  The reason, according to 
the WBCSD (2009), may be the low skills associated with agriculture in the region, and 
the lack of skills demand for formal training in planning, accounting and marketing.  The 
fact that 30 percent of the mine’s 4,000 workforce has not reduced poverty has been a 
source of tension between the communities and Newmont.   
Many of the residents interviewed have questioned effects of the mine on the 
communities.  One significant change is the dramatic increase in the cost of living, 
including, but not limited to: land and property values, rent increases, and food prices at 
the local market.  For example, one informant interviewed recounted how housing rent 
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have increased dramatically from 2-3 Ghana cedis (GHC) per month to 20 GHC due to 
land speculation since the development of the Ahafo Mine.   
A second major change experienced in the community is increase in the rate of 
teen pregnancy.  Due to higher cost of living, and the loss of land and income for resettled 
farmers, interviewees have indicated that for the sole reason of supporting their families, 
school-aged girls have engaged in prostitution.  The Annual Education Review Report 
reveals consistent increase in pregnancy among girls between 2010 and 2013 in the two 
districts.  Seventy-three pregnancy cases were recorded among school age children in the 
Districts (Government of Ghana, 2013: 22).  Out of the thirteen communities that make 
up the Districts, Ntotroso and Kenyasi I reported the highest rate of teen pregnancy.  The 
Government of Ghana attributes the consistent increase of pregnancy cases to mining 
activities and galamsey in the region “coupled with broken homes, poverty on the part of 
the parents of the affected children and peer influence” (GES, p.23).  The link, according 
to residents, is that with the farmers’ loss of income and increases in rent since the mine’s 
arrival, many parents now rely on their children to compensate for higher cost of living at 
the expense of attaining education.  For girls, this often means engaging in prostitution.   
Newmont Mining Corporation’s Ahafo Mine makes an interesting case study for a 
variety of reasons.  First, the company has voluntarily made significant strides in ensuring 
that the mine’s adverse environmental and social effects are minimized.  This is 
demonstrated through Newmont’s commitments to sustainable development.  Examples 
of company’s contributions to sustainable development are through its active participation 
in international initiatives, such as becoming a founding member of ICMM that adheres 
to the 10 Principles for Sustainable Development, as well as ongoing involvement in the 
United Nations Global Compact.  Participation in both initiatives requires that the 
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company report its progress by measuring its performance in areas of community 
engagement, environmental protection and corporate governance.  Appendix D 
summarizes Newmont’s CSR priorities and its approaches to development across all its 
projects around the globe.    
For Newmont’s Ahafo Mine in Ghana, both the company and the Newmont Ahafo 
Development Foundation (NADeF) carry out CSR activities to meet the company’s 
development priorities.  The company is primarily responsible for economic priorities of 
CSR initiatives, while NADeF manages development projects related to health care, 
infrastructure development and education. 
Second, at the national level, Newmont is a signatory member of the EITI in 
Ghana, and has been transparent about its payments to the Government of Ghana on taxes 
and royalty payments.  Newmont openly touts its efforts to promote transparency with the 
view of “reduc[ing] the devastating effects that corruption can have on economic 
development and the rule of law” (Newmont, 2014).  
The company’s international and national initiatives described thus far are a 
reversal of company’s mistakes compared to its Yanacochoa Mine in Peru, where critics 
have accused Newmont of ignoring its negative environmental and social impacts on 
local communities.  The Yanacocha Mine – is known for being one of the world’s most 
productive and profitable gold mine – is infamous for the social conflicts with 
communities and toxic contamination of the environment by mercury spills (e.g. see The 
Cost of Gold, 2010; No Dirty Gold, 2014b).  Carson et al. (2005) explains that in the case 
of Yanacocha, the company confronted accusations and legal challenges against its 
environmental performances and corruption and interference with government officials, 
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all of which have pressured Newmont to “pursue the highest standards of corporate social 
responsibility” (p.23).   
Fourth, a similar Saint Mary’s University Master’s thesis was undertaken by 
Whellams (2007) to ask the question whether Newmont’s CSR programs in Bolivia and 
Peru had contributed to the development of locally affected communities.  In both 
instances, Whellams (2007) concluded that “CSR can contribute to the sustainable 
development of the communities in which they operate” (p.104).  However, Whellams’ 
(2007) analysis provided also suggests that success “…depends largely on the way the 
initiatives are designed and how they respond to local circumstances” (p.104).  In the 
field of social sciences, it is imperative to ask similar, if not the same, questions on 
multiple case studies, and apply similar set of hypothesis and assumptions.  Given 
Newmont’s multiple projects and extensive experience in CSR in different parts of the 
world, it is then appropriate to select Newmont to test my research questions and 
hypothesis.   
Newmont’s,Ahafo,Mine,CSR,Projects,in,Ghana,
The second objective of the thesis is to evaluate Newmont’s CSR initiatives to 
determine if its voluntary initiatives achieved its intended goals of contributing to social 
and economic development in the host country where the company operates in.  To 
achieve this objective, the remainder of this chapter carries out the first task of describing 
the various components of Newmont’s voluntary initiatives.   
Newmont’s CSR initiatives are funded two ways: one, the company donates one 
dollar U.S. for every ounce of gold sold by the company, as well as one percent of 
Newmont’s net pre-tax income (i.e. revenue) (NADeF, 2008: 9); and second, the 
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company internally work with local government agencies and stakeholders to identify 
community needs, such as farmers who have been resettled as a result of the mine by 
establishing ALPs.  Established in 2008, the objectives of Newmont’s development 
foundation are to provide social and economic development to the ten locally affected 
communities, as agreed upon between the company and the Ahafo Social Responsibility 
Forum (a body represented by 10 Ahafo Mine Communities, local and regional 
government and civil society).  Since NADeF’s inception, a total of GHC 29.7 million 
have been contributed by Newmont (GhanaWeb, 2014).25  For each of the ten 
communities earmarked for these funds, a Sustainable Development Committee (SDC) 
made up of nine members works with the community to select projects that will 
contribute to community development.  While the vast majority of the funds received are 
to be spent on development projects each year, NADeF’s charter stipulates that ten 
percent of annual budget in the first five years are to be invested into an endowment fund 
over the life of the mine.  This percentage increases from ten to fifteen percent during 
second five year period, and then twenty and twenty percent in the subsequent five-year 
periods.  According to an interview with a NADeF staff, the objective of the endowment 
fund is to ensure that funds remain available to the communities after mine closure.   
A fixed percentage of Newmont’s financial contributions are allocated into the 
following categories for development: human resource development (24%); economic 
empowerment (17%); infrastructure (23%); natural resources protection (4%); cultural 
heritage (12%); sports (4%); and social amenities (16%) (ibid, p.9).  For each of these 
categories, projects are required by NADeF to meet a number of sustainability criteria 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25!The!amount!of!GHC 29.7 million converts to approximately!US$17.6!million!
(Newmont,!2014b).!!!
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that provide long-term benefits, meet community development needs, and ability to be 
managed and serviced within available resources and capacity (ibid, p.11).  Table 1 
summarizes projects that were completed by NADeF in 2013 alone.     
Table 1: Completed CSR Projects in 2013.   
CSR Programs Project Description 
Education • GHC 5,306073.01 worth of scholarships awarded to 
4,986 tertiary and Senior High School students 
• Apprenticeship training for 499 students 
Economic Development • Establishment of NADeF Micro Credit Scheme to start 
and boost economic activities for development 
• Micro-credit recipients increased from 661 in 2012 to 
781 2013 with total disbursement of GHC 285,100.   
• Loan of GHC 9,774.50 to youths for hairdressing 
business start-up in Ntotroso 
• Grants awarded to community-based organizations to 
improve girl’s education and entrepreneurial skills  
Infrastructure  • Furnished Records Department for Gyedu clinic 
• College of Nursing (Ntotroso) 
• Classroom block with furnishing  
• Supply of computers and accessors for College of 
Nursing 
• 2-Storey classroom block for Osei Kofi Abiri Model 
School for Kenyasi 
• 12-seater aqua privy for DA basic school at 
Wamahinso 
• Teachers’ Quarters at Afrisipakrom 
• Renovation and furnishing of Adrobaa DA school  
• 10-seater aqua-privy for Presbyterian school at 
Susuanso 
• Six mechanized boreholes at Adrobaa 
• Nurses’ quarters renovated at Terchire  
• 12-seater aqua privy toilet facility at Terchire  
• 14-seater toilet at Susuanso  
• Aqua-privy toilet facility at Adrobaa 
• Furnishing of Kenyasi 1 Sustainable Development 
Committee for Kenyasi I 
• Construction of palace in Gyedu 
• Sponsorship of librarians for three libraries in 
Afrisipakrom, Yamfo and Susuanso 
• Modern Community Center for Kenyasi I 
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• Mini-bus for Ntomem Traditional Stool, Wamahinso 
• Extension of electricity at Wamahinso and Terchire 
• Gyedu Information Center  
• Grassing of Terchire football park  
• Improve meat shop and market stalls for Susuanso and 
Terchire 
Source: NADeF (2013) 
Education((
The company’s priority is to increase access to and improve quality of education 
in the affected communities.  NADeF’s education activities include: construction of new 
primary schools, upgrades and improvements to existing school infrastructure, and 
provision of scholarships enrollment to local youths. Table 2 summarizes the breakdown 
of available human resource funds, which are scholarships awarded to high school and 
tertiary students for each of the four communities from 2008 to 2012.  NADeF’s 
commitment to providing scholarship is financed by twenty-four percent of NADeF’s 
budget.  
Table 2: Total Funds Allocated to the Four Case Study Communities (2008-2012) 
Communities Human Resource Develoment  (in Ghana cedis) 
Gyedu 381,714.02 
Ntotroso 654,541.00 
Kenyasi I 436,400.00 
Kenyasi II 689,622.00 
Source: NADeF Released Report, 2013.   
In addition to scholarships, a number of improvements have been made to the 
local schools.  According to data provided by NADeF at the time of interview, two 
classrooms at the Presbyterian and Methodist Junior High School in Kenyasi I were 
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renovated into computer labs to serve as ICT Training Centre.  Furniture such as office 
desks and chairs were provided as part of the infrastructure upgrade.  In the adjacent town 
of Kenyasi II, a six-unit classroom was constructed and furnished.  Elsewhere in 
Ntotroso, infrastructure upgrades include the construction of a six-unit classroom block 
with additions such as offices, stores, common room for staff and computer library.  
Upgrades were also made to the Kwakyekrom School in Ntotroso.  This includes 
renovation of a classroom and extending the electrical grid to the school, allowing the 
school to be more functional.  As for upgrades to other infrastructure pertinent to the 
education sector, funds were used for the construction of a four-unit teacher’s quarters in 
Ntotroso.  Already completed projects in Gyedu are new four-unit teachers quarters and 
new three-unit kindergarten block to expand the existing primary school.   
Several projects remain ongoing projects that are yet to be completed.  In Kenyasi 
I, a new ICT Training Centre is planned for the Anglican and Roman Catholic Junior 
High School.  A new two-story classroom block with offices, library and computer lab is 
currently under construction at the Osei Kofi Abiri Junior High School.  A key criticism 
brought forward from a local school was that while the school benefited from a new 
computer lab, a projector was not provided which defeated the purpose of the project 
because the instructor was not able to teach.  Instead, the instructor had to go student to 
student for instructions.   
Health(
Since Newmont’s arrival, no new hospitals and clinics have been built in the four 
communities.  However, according to an official in Ghana Health Services (GHS), 
Newmont’s contributions to local health related services and facilities has been upgrade 
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of existing clinics, provision of supplies, and capacity building of health staff.  
Specifically, GHS stated that the company has been active in the communities in the 
following ways:  
• Renovation of the debilitating Health Centre in Kenyasi (includes interior and 
exterior renovation and finishings);  
• Construction of semi-detached housing for GHS staff;  
• Provision of hospital beds at the Kenyasi and Gyedu Health Centre;  
• Donation of 12 used computers to clinics and 1 laptop to District Health 
Directorate;  
• Training of lab technicians for malaria testing;  
• Training of village health volunteers to be home-based health workers for malaria 
patients;  
• Provision of 1,000 insecticide nests;  
• Community sponsorships for events such as World Health Day, Malaria Day, 
National Immunization Day;  
• Construction of a community borehole in the Gyedu clinic; and  
• Construction of a nursing school in Ntotroso.   
In partnership with Project C.U.R.E., a U.S. based nonprofit medical NGO providing 
supplies to developing countries, several health clinics in the two districts have received 
$2 million worth of medical equipment and supplies, including dental surgical 
instruments, x-ray unit, wheel chairs, oxygen masks and lab kits, operating tables 
(Newmont, 2014c).  Upon delivery of the equipment and supplies to the health clinics, the 
company, the District Health Directorates, and representative of Project C.U.R.E 
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determined the needs of each facilities to ensure that the equipment and supplies were 
effectively distributed to meet the needs of each facilities.    
Economic(and(Capacity(Building(
In addition to social programs such as education and health, the company has 
launched initiatives to diversify the economy and capacity-building activities under the 
ALPs, primarily targeted for households and businesses that have been displaced and 
resettled for mineral development.  The ALP initiative consists of several programs with 
specific targets.  First, the Agricultural Improvement and Land Access Program (AILAP) 
directly assist resettled farmers by providing agricultural inputs, technical assistance and 
incentives to return to farming activities.  According to Newmont’s socio-economic 
study, the program has paid over one million cedis in cash to almost 4,000 farmers with 
over 6,400 acres of land (Kapstein and Kim, 2011: 41).  Agricultural inputs provided also 
include seeds, fertilizer and herbicides.  According to a staff interviewed at OIC 
International, a U.S. based NGO responsible for Newmont’s ALP programs, AILAP’s 
main objective is to improve food security for resettled farmers by increasing agricultural 
food production as if land was not lost.  A second objective of AILAP is to help farmers 
transition from subsistence to market production to be sold to local and international 
buyers. OIC has been actively involved in delivering a Business Plan Training, and 
assisting farmers with calculating how much each farmer can expect to sell and what kind 
of farming / crops need to be planted.  
 Secondly, the Livelihood Enhancement / Empowerment Program (LEEP) and the 
Skills Development and Income Improvement Program (SDIIP) are designed to support 
community members whose sources of livelihood were displaced from the Ahafo mine, 
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and are now seeking alternative income generating activities.  Alternative income 
generating activities include soap production, mushroom growing, animal production, 
baking, hairdressing, carpentry, catering, electrical installation, welding, etc.  Depending 
on the skills training selected, training could take up to two years.  According to the OICI 
staff interviewed, once training is completed, some inputs are provided to assist newly 
trained business owners to startup operations.    
Social Impacts of CSR 
Of the four categories CSR is responsible for, interviewees indicated that the 
communities have benefited the most from education-related programs.  A number of the 
residents interviewed were of the view that NADeF’s priorities to improve access to and 
expanding school infrastructure have had a positive development.  When asked about 
local experiences and perceptions on educational changes, 47 out of 80 (58%) 
respondents described increase in access to formal education for school children.  
One indicator of better access is the number of school enrollment.  The 2011 / 
2012 Annual Education Review Report by the Ghana Education Service (GES) validates 
community responses of increased access to schools.  In its report, GES reports that the 
total enrollment in the district increased from 35,184 in 2010 to 35,722 in 2013 
(Government of Ghana, 2013).  However, other factors may also contribute to higher 
enrolment numbers, such as in-migration of mine workers into the communities.  
According to the GES report, the “considerable increase in enrolment could be partly due 
to the influx of people as a result of mining activities in Ahafo area and partly due to the 
enrolment drive embarked upon by the Directorate” (p.22).  
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Although the department does not single out one contributing factor for enrolment 
increases, the experiences and perception of interviewees are that scholarships have 
improved access to formal education.  Table 3 summarizes the number of scholarships 
awarded in the four communities.   
Table 3: Number of Students Awarded Scholarships in 2011 
Community Male Female Total High School University 
Gyedu 40 14 54 34 20 
Ntotroso 44 33 77 39 38 
Kenyasi I 78 54 132 66 66 
Kenyasi II 136 94 230 185 45 
Source: NADeF 2011 Annual Report  
Scholarships, according to interviewees, not only covered enrolment fees, but 
alleviated the financial burden on families to pay for school related expenses such as 
uniforms and supplies.  In terms of the number of many students who received the 
scholarships, NADeF’s 2011 Annual Report reveal that communities with the most 
students benefiting from this program were located in Kenyasi I and II.  To qualify for the 
scholarships, local students must demonstrate that they are born and raised in the 
community.  For the families interviewed, this emphasis on “local content” has helped 
families send their children to schools where they previously may not have been able to 
afford to. Three senior high school teachers interviewed in Kenyasi II indicated that their 
school have seen increase in school enrollment as a result of scholarships awarded to 
local youths, as well as new faces from families who have migrated into the area looking 
for mining-related work.    
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While Bury (2004) has also observed similar patterns of increased access to 
education as a result of Newmont’s social programs for its Yanacocha Mine, the author 
also cautions that the changes “. . . have not been uniform, nor have they been distributed 
evenly between households and communities.” (p.89). In the case of the Ahafo Mine, not 
all community members have benefited from Newmont’s scholarship opportunities, 
particularly the resettled farmers whose lands were confiscated with little financial 
compensation.  Although a few resettled farmers did indicate improved access in terms of 
closer proximity to the schools after relocation, a number of them lamented lack of 
affordability.  For them, compensation package for resettlement does not guarantee 
entrance or access to primary education.  The frustrations expressed stems from high 
demand for limited number of scholarship opportunities available, combined with loss of 
income from lost farmland.  Many interviewed explain that access to and attainment of 
education has actually worsened since Newmont’s arrival.  Before mining activities, 
farmers’ incomes from crops were sufficient to pay for the children’s education.  One 
farmer in Kenyasi II said she had to stop her children’s education, because she could not 
earn as much income with the limited amount of new farmland provided to her.  For the 
less fortunate, many stated repeatedly that they are now unemployed with less farmland to 
work on, and that they now live in poverty.  Unlike resettled farmers in Ntotroso and 
Gyedu, the ones from Kenyasi II reported greater difficulty going to school because no 
new schools were built in the resettlement.  The experience of an interviewee is that if the 
school bus is full before arriving at the pick-up stop, the bus would just continue to school 
without returning.  According to one farmer, it can take up to three hours to walk to 
school.   
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Data collected regarding improvements to education in the four communities 
showed mixed results.  Indeed, as Newmont attest to, quantitative assessment on 
education such as increased access is not the only indicator of a well-educated society.  
When queried about community views on whether the community is better educated since 
the mine began operations, an overwhelming sixty residents out of eighty (75%) replied 
yes.  The Government of Ghana’s assessment of quality of education seems to support 
this view.  In its 2011 / 2012 Annual Education Review Report, the percentage of students 
passing the Basic Education Certificate Examination has improved from 62 percent in 
2010 to 73 percent the following year and 92% in 2012 (Government of Ghana, 2013: 
26).  2012 experienced a dramatic increase due to new policies that changed the grading 
system to enable more children to pass (Government of Ghana, 2013: 27).  The report 
does not, however, describe or explain rationale for changes in the grading system to 
allow for greater passing rate.  From this perspective it can be argued the 2012 data may 
not in fact reflect improvement in the quality of education.   
While the educational changes are perceived as improving thanks to scholarship 
opportunities and new infrastructure, residents cautiously suggest that the school situation 
is far from being where they want it to be.  For example, the opening of the Ahafo Mine 
has reinforced children’s traditional role as income earners in many of the poor household 
families.  Increase in the cost of living reinforces these views, which affect school 
enrolment and attendance when households rely on the children to support their families 
and siblings. Stephens (2000) explains that in a country where education has become 
increasingly expensive since structural adjustment, combined with cultural expectation 
that children will be expected to support the family, the economic cost of girls attending 
school are greater than boys because the return on their time spent at home is greater than 
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in school when pursuing short-term productive activities such as household tasks, or other 
“money seeking” opportunities (p.38).  According to a University of Ghana (2007) study, 
38 percent of the 165 girls interviewed in the mining communities of Tarkwa, where gold 
is mined, and Akwatia, a diamond mining town, dropped out of school, and 62 percent 
cited the reason for leaving school was to engage in mining-related work to earn income 
for their families (p.17).  The study further suggests that mining boom in the two towns 
have had negative impacts resulting in “. . . inadequate housing, youth unemployment, 
family disorganisation, school dropouts, prostitution and drug abuse . . .” (University of 
Ghana, 2007: 17).    
Evidence of improving health conditions in the four communities affected by 
Ahafo Mine is difficult find.  Of the eighty members interviewed, only twenty expressed 
the view that access to and availability of health services has improved, despite NADeF’s 
efforts to expand and improve health infrastructure, skills training for nurses and 
provision of health supplies.  For many residents, there has been a significant increase in 
the number of chronic illnesses and new diseases since Newmont’s arrival. Many of the 
residents have observed that more and more people have fallen sick to headaches, body 
aches, malaria, asthma, rheumatism, stroke and diabetes.  One respondent stated that 
Newmont has brought “evil” to the communities, with greater number of people 
exhibiting new symptoms never seen before, such as legs swollen followed by fluid 
emitted from the leg.  Another resident also suggested communities have seen reduced 
pregnancy rates with less women getting pregnant, in part the result of the hardships and 
suffering of the local people. When asked about the causes for people getting sick, many 
blamed Newmont and the mine. 
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Specific data on community health in the region and health impacts of the Ahafo 
Mine is limited.  Community accounts of deteriorating health and references to cyanide 
spill is likely linked to the cyanide spill in 2009 that killed a large number of fish and 
contamination of water sources used by the local communities.  Accused by local people 
and NGOs like Wassa Association of Communities Affected by Mining (WACAM) for 
Newmont’s failure to disclose and take responsibility of the incident, the Government of 
Ghana fined the company US $4.9 million for failing to prevent and report the spill 
(Mines and Communities, 2010).  Independent researchers have also voiced concerns 
about the impact of the project on community health, which corroborate the experiences 
of rise in health problems expressed by interviewees.  For example, both the Center for 
Science and Public Participation and the US Environmental Protection Agency 
independent technical review of the project identified risks of water contamination by the 
mine’s acid mine drainage (EarthWorks, 2014).  Case of malaria have also been 
suggested as result of the mine’s dam on the Subri River, where the stagnant water may 
be responsible for increase in mosquito populations and malaria in the area (EarthWorks, 
2014).    
The experiences and opinions conveyed by residents, however, differ from the 
explanations from GHS, who cautioned that there is no direct correlation between, for 
instance, increases in malaria rates to the Ahafo Mine.  Although government confirms 
that malaria has been rising, GHS attributes this to increases in galamsey activities.  Other 
contributing factors are the influx of people from other parts of Ghana seeking job 
opportunities at the mine.  Residents attribute the community’s poor health to mining 
activities such as blasting and dumping of chemicals that lead to pollution of air, land and 
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nearby creeks and rivers.  It was expressed that such a large mine presents airborne and 
water related health challenges such as dust pollution, and also water contamination.   
Many of the residents interviewed spoke out their frustrations about lack of new 
hospital, health facilities and services, and in particularly lack of doctors.  Some felt 
deceived by Newmont’s promises, such as a new hospital.  Although illnesses have been 
on the rise, many interviewees lamented the limited capacity of local clinics to diagnose 
and treat the symptoms.  Some did, however, acknowledge improvements to facilities 
such as the renovation of the Kenyasi Health Centre, which serves 560 on a weekly basis 
(Newmont, 2013).  Renovation of this health centre included “partitioning the old 
building with cement blocks, re-roofing, adding five toilets, extending water pipelines, 
replacing electrical fittings, and repainting and installing a septic tank . . . refurbishing 
nurses’ quarters and building two-bedroom apartments” (Newmont, 2013).  Except for 
upgrades to the water pipelines, many residents stated the improvements did not expand 
the capacity of the clinic to treat the patients, nor has the mine’s health impact been 
minimized.  Residents conclude that public health of the community and access to health 
services have deteriorated.   
In the interview responses, many factored in Ghana’s National Health Insurance 
Scheme, a government sponsored health insurance coverage that requires an annual 
payment of 15 cedis for adults, and 5 cedis for children.  The impact of the scheme has 
resulted in greater access to clinics, particularly among the poor who previously were 
unable to see a doctor.  However, barriers remain that prevent residents from receiving 
the care that they need.  One respondent in Kenyasi reported that although the scheme has 
improved access to healthcare, the drugs covered under such scheme are either expired, or 
of poor quality and ineffective.  If the patient can afford to pay for the drugs, or paid by 
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employer’s insurance plan, then the clinics would issue drugs that are stronger and more 
effective.  From this perspective, the cost and access to healthcare is more expensive and 
restrictive for those unable to afford the drugs.   
For resettled farmers, their experiences with healthcare were reported to be more 
acute.  For reasons explained previously, the loss of income for farmers on their new land 
means that the cost of seeing a doctor is no longer affordable, as well as the insurance 
scheme.  While some displaced farmers are able to pay for the insurance scheme for one 
year, many could not renew coverage for the following year.  In the new resettlement 
areas, no new clinics or alternative health facilities have been established for the 
displaced farmers.  Consequently, the farmers need to travel greater distances to receive 
medical treatment.  For example, farmers residing in the resettlement in Ntotroso must 
travel to Gyedu to see a doctor.   
Lastly, many residents did suggest that the overall impact of the insurance scheme 
has helped improve access to health services, but inadvertently, also places greater greater 
demand on the healthcare system.  A more alarming trend is the increased demand 
combined with increased population and urbanization, deterioration of public health from 
mining related activities, and the inherent limitations by the company to contribute to the 
health system.  The lack of funding from both government and the mining company in 
increasing the capacity of local infrastructure, health services and man-power has led to 
decreased access.   
CSR and Local Economic Development   
 In the view of an OICI staff interviewed, the LEEP and SDIIP programs have 
been generally successful, but not without its challenges.  First, the staff emphasized that 
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the goal of these programs are to introduce alternative skills to support income generated 
from farming activities.  The purpose is to diversify income-generating activities by 
providing them with alternative skills.  It is not intended to substitute or replace other 
income-generating livelihood strategies. Due to unmanageable community expectations, 
many enrolled in the programs anticipate greater income earning potential than what the 
programs are intended for.  A second challenge expressed by the OICI are that farmers, 
now equipped with new training and techniques, have been reluctant to breakaway from 
traditional farming practices and methods.  This, however, suggests lack of understanding 
and recognition on the NGO’s part that the farmers have been utilizing techniques and 
methods that have been practiced for generations and improved over time.  For the OIC, it 
views farmers’ tendency to abandon ALP training in favour of old practices as 
unwillingness to cooperate.  The third challenge described by OICI are that alternative 
livelihoods are short-lived because the income generated are not re-invested into the 
inputs and expenditures needed to continue and maintain activity.  Instead, the income 
earned is used to pay for household expenses such as school fees or cost-of-living 
expenses.  Consistent with responses from other members of the community, the OICI 
staff has noticed that cost of living has increased substantially since Newmont’s arrival.  
Increased cost of living include, but not limited to: rent from 2-3 cedis a month to 20 
cedis; food prices at the local markets; restaurants; clothing; and healthcare.  Lifestyle 
amenities and choices are also in transition and increasingly urbanized with households 
purchasing and maintaining a urban lifestyle in rural communities, such as ownership of 
TVs and cell phones, which were previously considered rare and luxury goods.  A 
combination of all these factors has forced many beneficiaries of ALPs programs to divert 
its income to these expenditures, rather than re-investing back into the expenses.   
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 This top-down view from someone of influence and expert position hired by the 
multinational corporation differs from the views and experiences of local members of the 
communities interviewed.  When asked whether the ALP programs have been successful, 
23 out of 80 across four communities replied yes.  However, it should also be noted that 
37 residents provided no response.  The explanation provided for no response was due to 
lack of knowledge about ALP training programs.      
 ALP are administered by the OICI primarily in Gyedu.  Depending on the skills 
training, OIC hires existing businesses to assist with hands-on training such as head 
dressing, sewing and bread making.  Reports of success in these programs after training 
were mixed.  One common frustration with the ALP programs was the lack of 
employment and business opportunities once training is completed.  Once training is 
completed, the trainees were left on their own to find employment opportunities, or to 
create a startup a new business.  While many accept the fact that ALP training is similar 
to pursuing formal education with no guarantees in formal employment after completion, 
the frustration emanates from the fact that communities were not consulted on what types 
of training and skills were needed in the communities.  Another point of frustration was 
that the ALP programs are contributing to a surplus of labour in a market that is 
oversaturated with already established businesses and services (e.g. dress-making, 
sewing, baking, and soap production). The lack of market research and market demand 
for products and services promoted by mining companies is a well-established problem 
studied by Hilson and Banchirigah (2009), who argue that the training and inputs 
provided to people are based on the false assumption that the market for ALP goods and 
services exists, and that the knowledge and training provide the poor with the necessary 
entrepreneurial skills to adjust and respond to changes in the market.   
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As mentioned before on the limited supply of inputs provided, many have 
complained about the inadequate supply of inputs, or inappropriate input required to 
sustain livelihood activities to go with the inadequate compensation rewarded to farmers.  
The loss of income associated with less farmland for displaced farmers were exacerbated 
when the livestocks provided by Newmont died prematurely, or when the high yield 
seedlings were distributed during the wrong growing seasons.  The premature deaths of 
pigs, for example, are attributed to the animals being brought into a region characterized 
by rainforest climatic zone from a savannah region that the animals were accustomed to.  
Farmers who received livestock from the company were considered lucky, as many 
complained no livestock compensation.  As for the poorly timed distribution of the 
seedlings, farmers’ experience in Ntotroso was that cocoa and plantain seeds would only 
arrive mid-June when the seeds need to be planted the first week of April.  And the 
second round of seeds would arrive in November during the dry season when the seeds 
die.  The problem, as some suggested, was that the Ministry of Food and Agriculture 
(MOFA) delivered the seedlings only when payment from the company is received.  If 
payment is delayed, so were the deliveries to the farmers.    
A major concern voiced by interviewees is food insecurity.  In a region where 
seventy percent of Brong-Ahafo’s labour force works in the agriculture sector 
(Government of Ghana, 2014), the Ahafo Mine has worsened the food security of the 
local population due to its location in Ghana’s breadbasket land and 97 percent of the 
people affected identify agriculture as their main livelihood activity (No Dirty Gold, 
2014a).  In a study commissioned by the International Growth Centre, Aragon and Rud 
(2013) found that agricultural productivity near mining areas in Ghana has decreased by 
forty percent from air and water pollution, and poverty for households whose main source 
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of livelihood is agriculture have worsened at a time when national standards of living are 
improving.   
As mentioned before, a paramount objective of the ALPs is to improve food 
security through agricultural programs (e.g. AILAP), or increase access to income by 
expanding farmers skills in non-agricultural activities (e.g. LEEP and SDIIP).  However, 
the array of projects available to farmers exacerbate the food security crisis by ignoring 
deficit in the loss of land compensated to farmers, and assumes that with the adequate 
supply of agricultural input (i.e. fertilizer), productivity level prior to resettlement can be 
achieved.  Furthermore, market rationale for LEEP and SDIIP is poorly developed and 
falsely assumes that with the right skills, the markets will come.  This is reflected in 
comments made by OIC staff when comparing the skills and training provided by the 
NGO to army of engineers graduating from engineering schools with no immediate 
guarantees in their chosen field of study.   
Transparency and Accountability  
Nearly all of the community interviews attributed issues of poor roads, poverty, 
chronic health illnesses, lack of affordability, environmental contamination, and food 
insecurity to Newmont’s mining activities.  In their views, the impacts of the mine have 
been predominantly negative, and the communities have derived minimal benefits.  A 
broader issue that encapsulates the local environmental and social impacts is the lack of 
accountability and transparency by District Assemblies and traditional chiefs when 
making-decisions on the behalf of the communities.  Without transparency, the 
dissemination of information has been absent, and contributes to lack of awareness and 
uncertainty over use of resource revenues and expenditures.   
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The communities conveyed a message of their proud contribution to national 
development with the region’s resource wealth.  It was also anticipated that the extraction 
of this wealth, however, would be channeled back to the communities through collection 
of royalties, and investments in social and economic development.  For example, in 2009 
Newmont’s payments to the Government of Ghana amounted to about USD $40 million, 
approximately 1% of government’s revenues (Kapstein and Rene, 2011: 27-28).  
According to the Government of Ghana (2013) report under the EITI, in 2010 the Ahafo 
Mine generated revenue of 887 million GHC and paid 26 million GHC in royalties.26  The 
redistribution and use of wealth, however, has been less transparent.  This is compounded 
by lack of information on how public money and compensation funds are spent.   
Amongst the resettled farmers interviewed, many lamented their disposition on 
the financial and social assistance received for resettlement.  Chief among their concerns 
are the inadequate compensation for loss of property in land concessions negotiated 
between the tribal chiefs and the company.  Prior to resettlement, interviewees stated that 
land ownership averaged ten acres; whereas after resettlement, the agreed compensation 
negotiated between farmers between the company and traditions chiefs averaged two 
acres, along with financial payments for lost crops that that did not account for value of 
fallow crops.  These findings are consistent by other studies where Hilson and Haselip 
(2004) argue that the procedure for obtaining compensation is often inadequate and unfair 
because crops not grown and planted at the time are not included.  Furthermore, the 
authors cite that the 703 farmers compensated by the Ahafo mine received only 70,000 





100,000 cedis short of its salvage value (Hilson and Haselip, 2004: 32).  Not only do 
compensation fail to account for crop’s potential higher value at maturity, companies 
have also been accused of failing to distinguish between higher value and lower value 
crops, resulting in less money paid to the farmers (University of Texas, 2010: 3).   
While studies like the one from University of Texas attribute inadequate 
compensation to uneven power relations between farmers and MNCs and injustices of the 
legal system, Standing and Hilson (2013) argue that traditional chiefs benefited greatly as 
intermediary negotiators and managers of the compensation paid to resettled farmers.  
More importantly, Standing and Hilson (2013) attribute to the problem to the fact “There 
are no mechanisms in place for accountability and transparency of these funds paid to 
chiefs.” (p.8).  While the traditional chiefs continue to uphold role of surrogate 
government by many in the communities, those interviewed blame the traditional 
authority for negotiating inadequate compensation packages.  Entrusted by the farmers to 
make decisions on their behalf over relocation and fair compensation, the disheartened 
farmers expressed frustration over transparency measures detailing compensation 
packages and the benefits the chiefs have negotiated for – both of which are contentious 
issues raised by scholars such as Akabzaa (2009) and Standing and Hilson (2013).   
 Interviewees also emphasized the need for accountability and transparency over 
flow and use of funds by the District Assembly. For instance, communities have long 
campaigned for the 3.1 million cedis compensated for cyanide spill to be spent on 
upgrade of a Health Centre and building of a new hospital, rather than District 
Assembly’s choice of upgrade the local market and lorry park  (SpyGhana, March 3, 
2014).  Eric Addae, the District Chief Executive of the District Assembly, objected to this 
idea despite a special committee organized by the communities of Ntotroso and Kenyasi I 
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& II.  Residents interviewed expressed frustrations by lack of progress toward making use 
of the compensation money, while some pessimistically concluded that the money had 
already been spent.  Although total compensation of 7 million cedis was paid by 
Newmont to the government in 2011, recent media suggests that stalemate over use of 
money is no where close to resolution, and only 3.1 million cedis available for 
community projects.   
 The inability of local institutions to manage public funds in a transparent manner 
has the effect of limiting and thwarting CSR.  In education, newly constructed or upgrade 
of existing facilities were appreciated by many residents, and were much-needed to offset 
the lack of funding from local government’s District Assemblies’ Common Fund 
(DACF).27  However, they remain skeptical about short-term and long-term benefits if 
faced with chronic lack of funding and lack of transparency on government spending.  
For instance, the use of newly constructed computer labs in the schools is limited due to 
lack of funds available in DACF to pay for the electrical costs associated with computer 
use.  Similarly, teachers interviewed explained similar budgetary constraints in the 
Capitation Grant to pay for day-to-day operation of the school did not arrive.  Under such 
constraints, many felt that NADeF funds could be better used to pay for textbooks, school 
supplies, school report cards, and school related programs.  The health sector also 
experienced similar gaps in government funding.  While residents point to increased 
capacity of local health clinics as a result of the NADeF’s financial contributions and 
donation of medical supplies by the company, the pervasive sentiment in the communities 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 Under Section 252 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana, 7.5 percent of the national revenue is set 
aside and distributed to all the District Assembly in Ghana.  The fund is a development fund that 
redistributes national wealth for benefit of local communities 
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is that clinics remains under-funded and under-staffed to keep up with the increase rate of 
illnesses caused by mining activities. 
Chapter Conclusion  
 The data collected on Newmont’s CSR programs specific to the resource curse 
reveals that the possibility of private sector-led voluntary programs to address the 
resource curse is not possible.  This chapter discussed how one of the world’s largest gold 
mining company have implemented development programs, including perhaps the most 
promising global policy to rectify the political dimension of the resource curse – the EITI.  
Attempts to address other factors for resource curse – poor linkages, low human 
development, and resource funds – have also been pursued by Newmont and NADeF 
through voluntary programs in areas of education, health, and ALPs aimed at fostering 
positive socio-economic development for sustainable development.   
The chapter described CSR’s increasing influence and developmental role in the 
four communities, a region known for its high mineral resource values.  In doing so, CSR 
has replaced the state as agents of development through voluntary programs and self-
regulation.  Rather than improving the living conditions of the communities, the 
interviews conducted reveal pervasive levels of poverty in the form of: worsening of 
human and mental health conditions, food insecurity from loss of lands for agriculture as 
a traditional source of livelihood, greater vulnerability from increased cost of living, 
social inequalities, and uneven distribution of impacts on local communities.  More 
importantly, Newmont as a signatory to the EITI aimed at improving transparency and 
accountability have not had the intended impact of improving the management and 
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decentralization of mineral wealth, a barrier to CSR’s contributions to sustainable 
development.   
!  
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Chapter 4: Thesis Conclusion 
 
Gold mining has been a major economic activity in Ghana in the past century.  As 
Chapter 2 explains, the West African country has continued to exploit its mineral wealth 
based on a resource export-based development model. This national development 
strategy, however, has shifted from state-led model toward a neoliberal, market-led 
approach that promotes FDIs to generate mineral exports, GDP growth, taxes, and 
resource revenues.  As Ghana becomes more dependent on the resource extraction, critics 
are increasingly questioning the sector’s ability to improve the lives of the poor, minimize 
impacts of mining communities, and the developmental benefits of resource-based export.  
In response, CSR is increasingly used to deliver on the development benefits of resource 
extraction for the benefit of national development and wellbeing of local communities.   
This thesis examined whether mining and development is possible through CSR 
despite the recurrence of the resource curse in many countries.  It has been argued that 
CSR can enhance the contribution of mining activities to development by reducing state 
regulation of the industry, leaving companies to voluntarily regulate their own activities.  
Central to the CSR model is the role companies are expected to play in relation to the 
local community in minimizing the negative impact of mining on the environment and 
local communities.  Furthermore, CSR underscores the superiority of private sector as the 
solution for overcoming the economic, social and political factors that have led natural 
resources down the path of underdevelopment in mineral-dependent economies.  
In answering the question of whether CSR can address the development 
challenges of the resource curse, findings from field research supports that the thesis 
statement that CSR is an ineffective tool and has not contributed to the development. In 
! 110!
the case of the Ahafo Mine, the concerns expressed by communities regarding the 
negative effects of the mine mirrors many of the environmental and social costs 
experienced by countries endowed with resources: unabated levels of poverty, poor 
human welfare, livelihood insecurity, limited economic opportunities, and lack of 
transparency and accountability.     
Chapter 3 reveals several limitations that render CSR an ineffective policy tool to 
respond to the curse.  CSR failures are attributed to voluntary nature of CSR as severely 
inadequate in dealing with poor developmental outcomes.  As the case study illustrates, 
the negative social, economic, and political outcomes experienced by the communities 
falls within the responsibility of the state.  While the communities nearby the mine 
attribute the worsening of living conditions to Newmont and the mine, the solutions 
require structural changes that enable greater government involvement.  This means a 
reversal of the development model pursued by Ghana away from market-based strategy 
that emphasizes private sector and self-regulation, and a shift back to state-led 
development model that favours an active and intervening state.   
Several reasons underscore why CSR did not mitigate the resource curse.  First, 
company voluntary programs are often described by interviewees as the following: short-
term, lacking consistency, and do not provide long-tem solutions to the problem.  While 
Newmont’s social programs have provided assistance to alleviate demands on education 
and health-related services, government programs remain poorly funded and ineffective 
when local authorities do not received the national funding for delivery of the programs.  
This in-spite of increasing mineral royalties and taxes collected by the state.  In instances 
where funds have been allocated for spending on development projects, local state 
administrators and traditional authorities are often accused of rent-seeking for the misuse 
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and mismanagement of the funds.  While there is widespread acceptance amongst 
interviewees over the lack of funds available in the DACF and the state, it is not 
transparent over how much funds should be allocated to the communities.  Lack of 
accountability by authorities also exacerbates issues of transparency in state funding.  
Many of the interviewees expressed lack of willingness on the part of the community to 
demand greater accountability over officials.  Interviewees attribute their reluctance to the 
cultural norm that traditional authorities serve as the trusted authorities to make decisions 
on behalf of the communities.    
 Second, an important factor limiting CSR as a tool for addressing developmental 
concerns is its voluntary basis and willingness by MNCs.  The voluntary nature and lack 
of consensus on an agreed CSR definition, as discussed in Chapter 1, means that 
Newmont’s  “social responsibility” is defined internally based on how a company views 
its own relationship with the affected communities.  Blowfield and Frynas (2005) suggest 
that this can be problematic as CSR can be interpreted for different purposes.  If CSR is 
defined according to Blowfield and Frynas’s umbrella definition (Chapter 1), an 
important aspect to consider is how Newmont views its social responsibility with not only 
the communities, but also how the company distinguishes itself in relation to the state.  
From the interviewee’s perspective, Newmont’s short-term, inconsistent, and 
uncoordinated voluntary programs suggest that the company considers itself a mining 
company first.  Implicitly, the corporation does not view itself as bearing any 
responsibilities for the state, nor as an “agent of development” for delivering long-term 
benefits and social services.  Newmont’s commitment to the communities is limited to 
only that of international codes and principles defined as CSR’s global institutional 
infrastructure (Sagebien and Whellams, 2010: 504).  While Newmont’s CSR programs 
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reflect a new wave of social regulation that symbolizes absences of the state in dealing 
with negative impacts of the mine, the accounts and experiences of the communities 
reveal that the gaps and failures left behind by the state are too large to be voluntarily 
filled by the private sector.   
Future Research & Alternatives  
As many scholars have argued, it is only until recently that the resource curse 
literature attributes the developmental problems of resource-export and dependency as a 
political problem rooted in issues of institutional quality and governance.  This raises 
additional questions about the types of institutional arrangements and approaches to 
building the necessary governance regime for ensuring resource revenues are spent and 
invested.  While some argue that this requires democratic governance regime that 
promote accountability, transparency, and checks and balances, further research is needed 
on how these elements of governance can promote development within a political 
economy that promotes corporate self-regulation.  The thesis has shown that Ghana’s 
political economy have both macro-level and micro-level consequences.  Field findings 
reveal that Ghana’s decision to reduce the percentage of resource revenues it collects, and 
handover of regulatory responsibilities for voluntary CSR have had the effect of 
worsening living conditions and underdevelopment.  Thus, an important question to be 
asked for future research is what institutional arrangements can promote development 
within a political economy that promotes state deregulation?  What institutional 
mechanism can address both the macro- and micro-level impacts of market-led 
development?    
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Second, as this thesis has argued, if the resource curse cannot be addressed due to 
the voluntary nature of CSR, further questions are warranted about the role of CSR and 
how state institutions can play a role in CSR.  Specifically, whether the state can 
influence CSR to deliver the developmental benefits of resource extraction.  If institutions 
are to have any responsibilities for CSR, it is imperative to first recognize that CSR is a 
form of self-regulation, and symbolizes a handover of state responsibilities over to the 
private sector for development.  Similarly, if the state is to have any role in CSR, the 
current political economy created by the economic reforms will need to reduce private-
sector power and require states to have greater responsibilities as a regulator.   
Interviewees expressed that while CSR have alleviated some of the hardships 
experienced, voluntary measures have had limited impact without state involvement.  
This collaborates with findings of Chapter 2 whereby state involvement in national 
development strategies have been eroded since independence, from direct state 
intervention in the form of nationalization in the 1960s – 1970s, to a reduced role that 
limits its involvement in the economy by ensuring that the mineral sector is stable for 
attracting private investments.  Under the market-led development model, any moves that 
suggest states taking on a more assertive or interventionist roles were strongly 
discouraged in fear of scaring away potential investments. However, CSR failures are the 
result of the governance gaps created by neoliberal model of market-led development.  
Governance gaps are most noticeable as states implement the strategy of “selective 
absence” by delegating to corporations the responsibility for working with communities.   
For CSR to have any possibilities of mitigating the resource curse within the a 
political economy that promote market-led style development, an important question to be 
asked is under what institutional and governance framework can CSR function that best 
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serve the interests of the communities?  One example that addresses such question is the 
requirement by Government of Ghana’s Minerals Commission for major mines operators 
to have mandatory CSR reporting.  While the Minerals Commission issues guidelines for 
reporting requirements, the guidelines are merely suggestions that lack development 
targets, goals and penalties.  To the extent CSR can be effectively mandated by an 
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Appendix A: Government and NGO Interviews  
!
A. Introduction: 
• Brief introduction of myself 
• Brief introduction of research  
• Assure confidentiality and an opportunity to review the transcripts and make any 
changes to them. It will noted that applicants can retract statements or the whole 
interview (should they wish) at a later date. Use consent form if necessary. Ask 
permission to use tape recorder. 
 
B. Confirm Respondent Background Information: 
• Position title 
• Role in organization 
 
C. Substantive Questions: 
• Research suggests that CSR are meant to serve a number of objectives. 
Specifically, these are: 
o To minimize social and environmental impacts of a company’s mining 
project on local communities.  
o To build positive relationships and trust between the mine developer and 
signatory groups 
o To secure local economic and social benefits in areas of skills training, 
health care, education and capacity building.   
• In your mind, did I get this right? 
• What is your general view of CSR to date? Are you glad that CSR programs are 
available to the community?  
• Do you have a view/judgment on CSR? If so, what is your view? 
• Specifically, do you feel that CSR have: 
o To minimize social and environmental impacts of a company’s mining 
project on local communities.  
o To build positive relationships and trust between the mine developer and 
signatory groups 
o To secure local economic and social benefits in areas of skills training, 
health care, education and capacity building.   
• How can CSR be improved upon in the future? 
• How many Ghanaians are employed at the Ahafo Mine, and where do they reside?  
(This question is for Chamber of Mines and Ghana Mineworkers Union.) 
• Do mineworkers have greater access to the services and programs provided by the 
mining company?  (This question is for Chamber of Mines and Ghana 
Mineworkers Union.) 
D. Conclude interview 
• Could you recommend any other potential key informants that you think would be 
particularly useful to this research? 
• Would I be able to send you an email if I think of something else? 
• Thank you’s 
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Appendix B: Community Interviews  
 
A. Introduction  
• Brief introduction of myself 
• Brief introduction / outline of research 
• Assure confidentiality and an opportunity to review the transcript and make any 
changes to them (see attached).  It will be similarly noted that applicants can 
retract statements or the whole interview (should they wish) at a later date.  Use 
consent form if necessary (see attachment).  Ask permission to use tape recorder.   
B. Respondent Background Information  
 
1. Respondent Age  
a. 16 – 20  
b. 21 – 40 
c. Over 40 
2. Respondent Sex 
a. Male            
b. Female 
3.  
4. What is your main occupation / livelihood? (ask)                                       
__ Agriculture __ Industry  
__ Government     __ Student  
__ Trader    __ Galamsey  
__ Animal Husbandry   __ Other (specify):  
__ Apprentice  
 
5. What is your level of education? (please state) 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
C. Education and Health Care Programs  
6. Since the mine came into production (since 2008), has there been increased, or 
decrease, in access to the following (circle one):  
• Education – Increase / Decrease 
• Health Services / Preventative Health Care – Increase / Decrease  
• Sanitation – Increase / Decrease   
 
7. What types of health services are available to you?  How much does it cost (cheaper 
or more expensive)?   
8. Are health services provided by the mining company, or by government?  
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9. Are there new hospitals and clinics built in the community since the mine?  
10. Have there been improvements in water sanitation?  
11. Do you or your children have access to education, and/or school supplies?   
12. Are scholarships or other education-related opportunities available to you?   
13. Do you feel the community is better educated since the mine began producing?   
14. Are there new schools and other school facilities?   
 
D. Economic / Infrastructure   
15. Since the mine came into production (since 2008), has there been increased / greater 
access to the following:  
__ Roads     __ Livestock 
__ Employment    __ Farming supplies 
__ Micro-credit / rural-credit programs  __ Dairy products  
__ Alternative Livelihood Programs  
 
16. What types of alternative livelihood programs are promoted? 
__ Oil palm agriculture    __ Farming  
__ Fish farming     __ Sericulture  
__ Snails      __ Batik (tie-and-dye) production  
__ Soap production     __ Maize / Cassava farming  
__ Livestock rearing (sheep, goats, pigs, etc) __Bakeries  
 
17. What are your views of alternative livelihood programs?  Has it been successful? 
18. How are alternative livelihood programs selected and decided?   
19. Are entrepreneurial skills training programs available in the communities (e.g. micro-
credit, decision-making, food processing, etc.).   
20. In your view, what is the preferred alternative livelihood programs / economic 
activities?  
__ Carpentry      __ Technicians  
__ Masonry      __ Galamsey 
__ Mechanics      __ Farming  
__ Other – please specify: -
_________________________________________________ 
 
E. Land and Natural Resources  
21. Since the mine came into production (in 2008), has there been decreases / worsening 
of the following: 
 
__ Irrigation / water supplies   __ Water quality  
__ Land for livestock    __Quality of land 
(pollution/erosion/intensification) 
__ Land for farming / agriculture  
 
22. Who is responsible for these problems?   
 
__ Mining company    __ District Assembly  
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__ Government    __ Tribal Chiefs  
__ Galamsey     __ Community members  
 
23. Have there been attempts by the mining company to address these environmental 
issues?   
24. Have there been attempts by the government to address these environmental issues?   
25. How should these issues be resolved?   
 
F: Community  
26. Since the mine came into production (in 2008), has there been any problems in the 
community in the following areas:  
__ Destruction of homes and properties  __ Environmental pollution  
__ Loss of farms and crops    __ Lack of compensation  
__ Unemployment       
__ Misuse of public funds by District Assemblies  
__ Increase in numbers of demonstrations and protests 
__ Lack of communication between community and company  
__ Lack of community development  
__ Inadequate alternative livelihood programs  
__ Poor fallow lands compensated to farmers  
__ Non-disclosure of royalty payments  
__ Other – Please specify: 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
27. What has been community’s reaction to these problems?   
__ Violent demonstrations     __ Legal action 
__ Peaceful demonstrations     __ Appeal to District 
Assembly  
__ Dialogue between community and company  __ Appeal to Chiefs 
 
28. Has there been any attempts to resolve these problems?  And by whom?  
29. What has been the result / resolution?   





Appendix C: Projects by Investment Capital and Jobs Created 
!
Country Project Investment, % of 2010 GDP 
Direct Employment, 
Number 




Botswana Jwaneng Cut 8 Project (diamonds) 20.2 
14,800 during 
construction; 3,000 
to 4,000 afterward 




Mozambique Benga Mining (coal) 13.6 
Currently 150; 
4,500 afterward 
Tanzania Mchuchuma (coal) 12.2 5,000 




Zambia Lumwana Mine (copper) 9.3 
4,700 during 
construction  













Appendix D: Newmont’s Corporate CSR Priorities   
 
Category Development Approach Examples 
Community 
Health  
Community health risks are 
assessed by independent experts to 
determine a mine’s potential social 
impacts.  In partnership with local 
communities, government agencies 
and global health organizations, 
Newmont works control and 
eliminate diseases such as malaria 
and HIV/AIDS. 
 
Newmont’s approach to this 
development priority is to improve 
the quality of and access to health 
care in the communities.   
In partnership with Project 
C.U.R.E., a U.S.-based medical 
aid NGO, medical supplies and 
equipment are provided in 
hospitals that serve communities 
around mining operations.  
Customized supplies and 
equipment include scrub brushes 
and skin prep sets, anesthesia, 
resuscitators, chest tubes and 
drainage units, globes, oxygen 
masks and tubing.  In Ghana, four 
containers have been delivered 
since 2009 worth $1.3 million. 
 
Since 2005, HIV/AIDS 
awareness, prevention, and 
treatment have been provided to 
employees and community 
members.   
Infrastructure 
Investment  
Investing in infrastructure 
development in mining 
communities is a key priority for 
addressing local challenges.  
Newmont leverages external and 
internal resources through 
partnerships or foundations (e.g. 
NADeF) to ensure community 
development projects achieve 
sustainable outcomes.     
In Peru, financial assistance to 
city of Cajamarca improved 
public safety and residential 
quality of life.  This includes 
surveillance video to help 
officials monitor crime and public 
safety.  A fibre optics platform 
was installed connected the 
cameras to the public Safety and 
Emergency Control Centre.   
 
In Ghana, $477,000 was spent to 
expand a water system to provide 
more reliable, safe and water 






Newmont’s goal is to achieve 
economic opportunities that can be 
sustained during and after the life 
of the mine for the communities.  
Planning for after mine closure 
begins at the earliest stage of the 
project development to ensure 
lasting programs.   
The Ghana Ahafo Linkage 
Program is to support local 
business development through 
purchasing power by increasing 
procurement from local suppliers.  
28 different product categories 
have been identified to be 
procured locally.   
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In Peru, a $2.4 million USD 
livestock development agreement 
with communities aims to help 
improve agricultural production 
for thousands of families.  
Program includes training for 
producers, improving pastures, 
fodder and feed, disease control, 
genetic improvement, 
construction of a storage facility, 
etc.   
Education  Newmont’s support for education-
related programs and scholarships 
extends beyond the company’s 
employees and their families.   
 
Local stakeholders in the 
communities often express that 
Newmont’s operations can be a 
catalyst for future opportunities for 
their children.  Newmont shares 
this value with the communities by 
improving the quality of and access 
to education for the local 
communities.   
Education related programs 
consist of financial contribution 
in the form of scholarships to 
construction of new schools, 
facilities and donations of school 
supplies.  In Ghana, scholarships 
have provided youths the 
opportunity to complete high 
school as well as university 
training.   
 
In Nevada, the Newmont Legacy 
Fund donated $91,636 to schools 
for initiatives including early 
childhood education, mentoring, 
hunger prevention and youth 
counseling.   
 
Source: Summarized from Newmont (2012) Sustainability Report  
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